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This thesis examines investigative decision making, cognitive biases, talent 
sharing, and the relationship between the random nature of lone-actor violence and a set 
of predefined decision-making protocols. This research included running four simulations 
using the Monte Carlo technique, which illustrated that with the dedication of additional 
resources came a concomitant effect of diminishing returns, opportunity cost, and 
exposure to liability. The simulations also suggested that regardless of an investigative 
agency’s decision-making processes, the outcome relies on the randomness of the event. 
To demonstrate a prototype for a new method of threat analysis, a “superforecasting” 
team of analysts participated in an experimental survey. Nine participants reviewed five 
threat scenarios and assigned a score based on factors including the potential for violence 
and immediacy of the threat. Analysis in the survey was accurate for four out of five 
scenarios. Survey participants also answered six prospect theory questions, set in a 
homeland security context, to assess their decision making under uncertainty. Considered 
together, the results from the simulations and the two-part survey explain the relative 
strength of certain threat assessments. They distinguish what may be detectable from 
what is statistically unpredictable through the use of a collaborative and multidisciplinary 
method of analysis.  
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This thesis examines investigative decision making, cognitive biases, talent 
sharing, and the relationship between the random nature of lone actor violence and a set 
of predefined decision-making protocols. Targeted violence presents a paradox for the 
homeland security enterprise. These single-attacker events, whether assassinations, 
school shootings, or lone-wolf terrorist attacks, are difficult to detect and interdict. In 
spite of the ephemeral nature of targeted violence, many of the most notorious incidents 
of targeted violence share a common characteristic: the attackers encountered, or were 
closely observed by, law enforcement before they attacked.  
This thesis is predicated on the assumptions that: 1) in many cases of lone actor 
violence, the most confounding problem is not detection of the actor but the decision of 
what to do after the suspect is detected; 2) lone actor violence is a random event that does 
not follow a predictable pattern over time and space; 3) in spite of the frequency of pre-
attack encounters between law enforcement and known lone actors, their actions do not 
meet the threshold for arrest before they attack; 4) given the other assumptions, when a 
decision to continue investigation is limited to a single organization, an agency, or task 
force, the likelihood for a successful outcome is as random as the attacks themselves. 
To demonstrate the random nature of lone actor violence, this research uses 
twotime series statistical techniques. The results of the runs test and the time series 
analysis indicated that the emergence of these events was random over time and space. 
This analysis shows that these events are driven by a wide array of motives. These types 
of attacks are committed by a diverse group of perpetrators, who direct them at a 
dispersed number of targets. This statistical treatment of the attacks suggests that some 
detection tools may not be effective and buttresses the case that these events are random 
and independent. 
To evaluate different decision-making protocols outside of the narratives of actual 
attacks, the researcher ran four separate simulations using the Monte Carlo technique. 
These simulations illustrate that with the dedication of additional investigative resources 
 xvi 
comes a concomitant effect of diminishing returns, opportunity cost, and exposure to 
liability. The simulations also suggest that regardless of the single investigative agency’s 
decision-making process, the outcome relies on the randomness of the event.  
These findings suggest that randomness itself may contribute to the decisions 
investigators make. If an investigator seeks literal “hard” evidence that an attack will 
occur and does not find it, then there is little wisdom in investigating further if the 
ultimate goal is arrest, whereby due process obligates a high evidentiary standard. If the 
decision is framed by the outcomes of earlier investigations, then the lack of evidence can 
provide an immediate reason to end the investigation they are currently facing. The 
organizational imperatives of investigative agencies to produce arrests and the 
consequences of false positives may amplify one another, thus reducing the impetus to 
commit resources to a less compelling case. These outcomes of these simulations suggest 
the need for a more precise decision-making model than those used in the Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
The statistical analysis and Monte Carlo simulations of lone actor violence may 
indicate that these attacks are unpredictable, but they may be detectable. Lacking a 
defined archetypical “profile” of an attacker renders the search for a definitive predictive 
model futile; however, identifying behaviors that may indicate a propensity toward 
violence makes detection of an attacker possible. 
To demonstrate a prototype for a new method of threat analysis, a 
“superforecasting” team of multiorganizational and multidisciplinary analysts 
participated in an experimental survey. Nine participants reviewed five threat scenarios, 
and then assigned a score based on various factors such as potential for violence and 
immediacy of the threat. 
Analysis by the experiment participants was highly predictive for three out of five 
scenarios and better than chance for a fourth scenario. The experiment was too small to 
claim that a superforecasting method is an improvement over single decision makers or 
investigative squads; however, the success of the analysis from this prototype was 
promising enough to consider a similar experiment on a larger scale. 
 xvii 
The survey also measured participants’ risk tolerances under uncertainty based on 
a prospect theory model. The participants answered six questions to detect risk aversion 
or risk seeking behavior and the “framing effect.” The participants’ responses were 
strongly consistent with prospect theory in some ways and less so in others; however, the 
pattern that emerged generally favors certain prospects to uncertain ones, despite the 
greater expected values of alternative choices. A parallel assessment of decision making 
through scenarios and hypothetical “prospects” presents a possibility for further research 
to determine the effects of risk tolerance on case study threat assessments. 
The model simulations demonstrated that there will always be attacks that are true 
surprises and that proportion may be large enough to draw the conclusion that many or all 
lone actor attacks are undetectable. The prototype superforecasting experiment, together 
with the prospect theory results, may help to explain the relative strength of some certain 
threat assessments: The results distinguish what may be detectable from what is 
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Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our 
inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of 
facts and evidence. 
—John Adams 
 
On November 5, 2009, a man entered a U.S. Army base in Fort Hood, Texas, and 
killed 13 soldiers. Soon thereafter, the facts about the attack became clear. The shooting 
was unprovoked, and the victims were unknown to the shooter. The shooter was a 
soldier, specifically a medical doctor who specialized in psychiatry. The shooter was 
named Nidal Hasan—an ethnic Palestinian, born in the United States, and a Muslim.  
Within days, the image of Hasan came into sharper focus. Before the shooting, 
Hasan exhibited workplace behavior that concerned his colleagues. Some of this behavior 
could be characterized as professional negligence; on other occasions, he was 
increasingly vocal about his religion and his moral crisis over the prospect of serving in 
an Army that fought predominantly Muslim nations. Most damning to him, and 
eventually to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was that Hassan communicated with a 
“notorious terrorist leader” about a year before the attack. The FBI was aware of the 
communication, identified Hasan as an Army major, and opened an investigation; 
however, the investigation closed months before the attack.1 
After the attack, the public discourse reduced to a basic question: If the 
government was aware of Hasan’s concerning behavior, then why did it fail to stop him? 
At about the time the information about Hasan’s communications was revealed, a 
                                                 
1 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb: 
Counterterrorism Lessons from the US Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack 
(Washington, DC: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2011), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf, 39.  
 2 
bipartisan Senate investigation began to examine what the Department of Defense and the 
FBI knew about Hasan, and why they failed to intervene in spite of that information.  
From its inception, the leaders of the Senate investigation fell into now-familiar 
interpretations of the Hasan story. Chair Joseph Lieberman, a centrist Independent who 
caucused with the Democrats, felt that the attack indicated that the federal government 
failed to learn the lessons that the 9/11 Commission identified. Had government agencies 
shared information across all levels of law enforcement and empowered analysts, the 
Hasan case would have been resolved more favorably. Senator Susan Collins, a moderate 
Republican, voiced concern over the government’s initial characterization of the attack as 
workplace violence, and she opined whether “political correctness” influenced the 
decisions of both the military and the FBI. This debate returned in the aftermath of 
subsequent attacks and was amplified in the 2016 presidential contest, wherein the 
Democratic candidate endorsed an “intelligence surge” to combat lone wolf terrorism, 
while her Republican opponent pointed to political correctness as a root cause for 
government’s failure to do so.2 
But facts truly are stubborn things, and as the primary sources of information 
reached the Senate investigative committee members, those facts did not fit neatly into 
their preconceptions. Lectures Hasan gave during his public health fellowship about 
Islam in the military did not depict him as a wild-eyed radical. In contrast, although 
colleagues may have disagreed with the premise of his presentation, but they did not 
appear outraged from by he said. His performance record during his medical internship 
indicated he was less the “ticking time bomb,” as described in hindsight by his former 
supervisor, and more of a ticking malpractice suit.3 
Yet one fact remained the most compelling; the investigation of Hasan came 
remarkably close to success. The military did not have cause to take significant action 
against Hasan, which would have disrupted his growing homicidal ideation, nor did the 
FBI have cause to arrest him. If these separate streams of information within Hasan’s 
                                                 
2 Nolan D. McCaskill, “Clinton Urges ‘Intelligence Surge to Counter Terrorist Threat,” Politico, June 
13, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/hillary-clinton-national-security-224267.  
3 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb, 33–34.  
 3 
military workplace and the FBI’s investigation converged, the threshold for action may 
have been met.4 If the totality of available information about Hasan’s behavior was 
placed into one narrative, the Fort Hood attacks may have been prevented. 
As a participant in the senate investigation, the question of why this narrative was 
not synthesized was most salient to me. My role within the investigation was as a staffer, 
so my questions in that role were often the same as those of the chair, ranking members 
of the committee, and my colleagues. As a practitioner of threat investigations, my 
questions were more elemental and circumspect. Was it fair to expect either Hasan’s 
coworkers in the military or the FBI to recognize his behaviors as indicators of emerging 
violence? Was it fair to expect the FBI investigators to examine Hasan’s behavior any 
further than they did, given their enormous workload?  
These questions would reemerge with every subsequent lone actor attack. The 
Boston Marathon bombers, the Orlando night club shooter, and the White House fence 
jumper all encountered law enforcement before they attacked yet still were able to 
commit those attacks. As with Fort Hood, I wondered what information was available to 
the investigators who encountered these individuals, and how that information influenced 
the decision they made to close their investigations. The recurring problem appeared to 
be less about initial detection of the threat, and more about recognizing an individual as a 
threat. 
If story of the Fort Hood is a story of bias in decision making, then the question 
remains what that bias may be. Law enforcement agencies may have an institutional 
propensity to close cases that do not present anything but the most compelling evidence. 
If this is true, the precursors to this bias may include aversion to “owning” the subsequent 
behavior of a suspect who, lacking any actionable evidence, could not be arrested yet 
may still commit a crime. Aversion to the risk of violating restrictions on investigative 
authority may dampen an investigative agency’s interest in investigating subjects who 
have not broken the law. Investigative agencies are also faces with a resource-allocation 
dilemma and must triage investigative leads, thereby chasing the ones that are more fully 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 7.  
 4 
formed. Finally, organizational bias, or groupthink, may inculcate investigators with a 
rigid definition of what a threat is, thereby making them less sensitive to emerging threats 
that did not resemble that paradigm. The premise of this thesis is that a combination of 
cognitive and decision-making biases contribute to the missed opportunities to intervene 
before lone actor violence occurs. The research within this thesis explores a method to 
counter those biases.  
 
 5 
II. THESIS PROPOSAL 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Targeted violence presents a paradox for the homeland security enterprise. These 
single-attacker events, whether assassinations, school shootings or lone wolf terrorist 
attacks, are difficult to detect and interdict. Lone actors do not respond to foreign 
command and control apparatuses, do not rely on elaborate support networks or 
detectable money trails, and often select targets that are difficult to anticipate and defend.  
In spite of the ephemeral nature of targeted violence, many of the most notorious 
incidents of targeted violence share a common characteristic: the attackers encountered or 
were closely observed by law enforcement before they attacked. For instance, Nidal 
Hasan, the perpetrator of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, was investigated by two FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces before he attacked.5 Omar Mateen was investigated twice by the 
FBI before he attacked the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando.6 The Tsurneyev family was the 
subject of intelligence and law enforcement inquiries both abroad and in the United 
States before the 2011 Boston Marathon attacks.7 Ahmad Khan Rahami, who was 
arrested for the 2016 New York and New Jersey bombings, was reported to the FBI by 
his father prior to the attacks.8 Finally, in 2014, Omar Gonzalez was investigated by the 
U.S. Secret Service before he jumped the north fenceline of the White House.9  
The police and federal investigators encountered the attackers because of actions 
the attackers took that indicated, in retrospect, they were in the midst of pre-attack 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 35–40.  
6 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Lichtblau, and Alan Blinder, “Omar Mateen, Twice Scrutinized by F.B.I., 
Shows Threat of Lone Terrorists,” New York Times, June 13, 2016.  
7 Scott Shane, Michael S. Schmidt, and Eric Schmitt, “Russia’s Warning on Bombings Suspect Sets 
off a Debate,” New York Times, April 25, 2013.  
8 Marc Santora and Adam Goldman, “Ahmad Khan Rahami Was Inspired by Bin Laden, Charges 
Say,” New York Times, September 20, 2016.  
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, 2014 White House Fence 
Jumping Incident (Redacted) (DHS-OIG Report OIG 16-64) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, 2016), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-64-Apr16.pdf, 53.  
 6 
behavior. Research by the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) of the U.S. Secret 
Service indicates that certain behaviors foreshadow targeted violence. A study of 12 
years of attacks against government facilities and officials by NTAC found that about 
three quarters of the perpetrators had contact with the judicial system, an educational 
system, one or more employers, or law enforcement prior to their attacks.10 
Why, given the concerns presented to investigators, have they repeatedly closed 
these cases? The answer may be found in the intersection between four fundamental 
components of the investigation: the investigator, the suspect, the investigative agency, 
and society itself. Characteristics of investigators, such as the methodologies they 
employ, their experience, and cognitive biases, may increase or reduce their propensity to 
investigate a lead further. Characteristics of suspects, particularly the behaviors they 
exhibit and the ones that are not obvious to investigators, will also affect the propensity to 
investigate. Finally, the imperatives of an investigative agency, the way it arrays it 
resources to counter a threat, and the methodologies it uses will influence the decision to 
move and investigation forward or not.  
Society provides the policies, laws, and social norms in which the other three 
components anchor their decision making. The investigators assess the behavior of a 
suspect relative to the baseline behaviors of the community. The actions the investigators 
take are also bound to the public’s expectations for safety on one end and the restrictions 
of police power on the other. As members of a community, the attackers may select their 
targets and the method of attack based on societal influences, even when the purpose of 
the attack is only apparent to the attackers themselves. An investigative agency is 
strongly influenced by society in the resources it receives to fulfill its mission, and it 
shapes and prioritizes aspects of that mission based on what matters most to society, 
using only those powers society deems appropriate. 
These four components represent separate forces, which like vectors, may align 
and amplify one another toward an obvious decision, or they may align in a 
countervailing manner, wherein the appropriate decision is less apparent. Exploring all of 
                                                 
10 National Threat Assessment Center, Attacks on Federal Government 2001–2013: Threat 
Assessment Considerations (Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 2015), 2.  
 7 
these aspects comprehensively is beyond the scope of a single thesis; however, they must 
all be considered when examining what is often the most critical decision in an 
investigation—whether to carry the case further. That decision is the watershed of those 
separate forces; therefore, the question of how that decision is made and how that 
decision can be improved forms the basis of this thesis.  
This thesis tests whether a new method of threat analysis, using a 
“superforecasting” method engaging a diverse group of analysts, will produce an accurate 
assessment of targeted violence. Crowdsourcing analysis would take individual threat 
assessments, distill them into a brief synopsis, and send the synopsis to a large number of 
vetted analysts. Those analysts could include local and federal investigators, intelligence 
analysts, social scientists, teachers, health care professionals, faith leaders, and any other 
field that may have a nexus into targeted violence investigations. These analysts would 
assign each brief a score based on various factors, such as potential for violence and 
immediacy of the threat. These analyses would then be aggregated, and a combined score 
would assist case management decisions, such as whether to close a case or investigate a 
threat further.  
This thesis is an examination of decision-making, cognitive biases, and the 
relationship between organizational form and function. This new approach is intended to 
stimulate interagency and multidisciplinary cooperation through a less centralized, 
networked environment. The end goal of this method is an evolution of information 
sharing into talent sharing.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question of this thesis is whether a “superforecasting” team of multi-
organizational and multidisciplinary analysts, produce more accurate and predictive 
analysis of potential lone actor threats than analysis from a single organization? A team 
of superforecasters, who are loosely networked in a way that transcended organizational 
boundaries and distributed across a broad cross-section of society, may better detect the 
ephemeral threats that lone actors present. An experiment that simulates this technique 
will indicate whether the superforecasting method is effective for detecting lone actors.  
 8 
An additional question this thesis explores is if the repeating pattern wherein 
perpetrators of targeted violence are investigated by law enforcement, but are left to 
commit their attacks, a consequence of organizational and methodological inadequacies? 
In spite of the trend in law enforcement and intelligence to form multiagency task forces, 
the work of an individual case is often conducted by a very small number of 
investigators. One example is the investigation of Nidal Hasan by the FBI in 2008 and 
2009 before he attacked in Fort Hood, Texas. This case was investigated by two FBI joint 
terrorism task forces (JTTFs), which are comprised of investigators and analysts from a 
wide array of agencies; however, the case itself was investigated in depth by only three 
people—an analyst and an FBI agent in one JTTF and Defense Criminal Investigative 
Service agent who was detailed to a second JTTF. In spite of their initial success in 
identifying Hasan, they did not extend their inquiry beyond the confines of the JTTFs, 
thereby missing an opportunity to put Hasan’s radicalization into context.11 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The detection of single actor and small group attacks is inherently challenging to 
investigative agencies. It must be acknowledged that single actor attacks are a very small 
phenomenon in comparison to other criminal trends. The problem of identifying potential 
targeted violence and intervening appropriately can be found in recent statistics. 
However, different researchers have yielded different tallies of these attacks. For 
example, a PBS Frontline report stated that there were 115 single-actor, or “lone wolf,” 
attacks in the United States between 1940 and 2016. 12 A report by the FBI and Texas 
State University counted 160 active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013, which 
killed 486, and wounded 557. The data used later in this thesis counted 190 lone actor 
attacks between 1982 and 2017, and three additional attacks occurred in the month since 
that analysis concluded. Regardless of which method is used, when compared to the 
                                                 
11 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb, 35–39.  
12 Katie Worth, “Lone Wolf Attacks Are Becoming More Common—And More Deadly” Frontline, 
July 14, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lone wolf-attacks-are-becoming-more-common-
and-more-deadly/.  
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number of murders in the United States in 2015, 15,696 in total, it can be asserted that 
acts of targeted violence are rare, and the total casualties are relatively small.13 
According to the FBI-Texas State study, all but two of the targeted attacks 
involved a single shooter.14 The 20 deadliest attacks since September 11, 2001 were 
perpetrated by individual actors or small groups. Seventeen involved an individual or pair 
of attackers using firearms, and the remaining three used vehicles, explosives, or 
biological weapons against their targets.15  
The statistics indicate that targeted violence may be “black swan” events, which 
Nassim Taleb defines as an event that is an outlier, carries extreme impact, and that 
human nature is compelled to explain after the fact.16 The October 2017 Las Vegas 
shooting, resulting in 58 deaths and the injury of many others, exemplifies this definition. 
The attack emerged without any apparent foreshadowing, and the nation that bore witness 
to the attack struggled to explain the meaning of the crime. To date, the killer’s motives 
for attacking remain unknown and stand in relief to the many other details since revealed 
about him. 
In a critical examination of the performance of investigators, it is also important 
to consider Taleb’s thought experiment in The Black Swan, which contemplates an 
alternate reality wherein a legislator successfully passes a law mandating locked cockpit 
doors just before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Taleb contends that if this law had 
passed, and the 9/11 attacks were thwarted, the legislator would likely go unheralded. 
This is what Taleb describes as “Black Swan blindness,” wherein successes go 
unheralded, and conversely, failures after a significant event are salient.17 
                                                 
13 “Latest Crime Statistics Released,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 26, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/latest-crime-statistics-released.  
14 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000—2013 
(Washington DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf, 6–7.  
15 Global Terrorism Database (queried using Country: United States / Time 2001—2016), accessed 
June 27, 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.  
16 Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 
2007), xvii–xviii.  
17 Ibid., xxiii.   
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In their defense, law enforcement leaders often posit an argument similar to 
Taleb’s and buttress it arguing, that given the facts that were presented to them, they did 
not have cause to arrest, much less prosecute. However, the idea that arrest is the only 
resolution for these cases may be part of the problem. In these cases, police and federal 
investigators encountered the attackers because they were engaged in pre-attack behavior, 
which if properly analyzed, could have prompted interventions short of arrest, but still 
preventative in nature.  
Research indicates that certain concerning behaviors foreshadow targeted 
violence. The NTAC’s study of 12 years of attacks against government facilities and 
officials found that about three quarters of the perpetrators had contact with the judicial 
system, an educational system, one or more employers, or law enforcement.18  
1. Current Organizational Models Struggle to Detect Lone Actor 
Violence 
Beginning in the late twentieth century, faced with threats that were increasingly 
multijurisdictional and networked, law enforcement and intelligence agencies countered 
with the development of task forces. Task forces represented a significant organizational 
innovation in a profession where organizations were traditionally insular and guarded 
information jealously. There is little available literature analyzing the performance of 
investigative task forces. This deficit may be from the difficulty of researchers to access 
and observe task forces or a general sense that these groups, as the best representation of 
the multiagency and multitiered solutions that were envisioned after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, are unimpeachable. It remains that task forces have not been subjected to the 
same scrutiny that their controlling agencies have.  
Given the deficit of research, an examination of task forces must begin with 
research and oversight reports of their parent agencies and then continue with research 
and theory into the decision making of small groups. The study of decision making, 
organizations and social network analysis provides a framework to venture into an 
                                                 
18 National Threat Assessment Center, Attacks on Federal Government, 2.  
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examination of task forces, and research an alternative design that may better serve threat 
analysis. 
Examining the performance of task forces and fusion centers has been limited to 
congressional committees and the agencies themselves. Although not academic, each has 
its advantages and disadvantages. Congressional reports may be skewed or amplified 
from political agendas, but the investigative mandate of Congress provides exceptional 
access to data in this secretive field. Agencies always trumpet their programs, but much 
can be deduced from what an agency emphasizes and what it does not. In Spying Blind, 
Amy Zegart examines organizational problems within the homeland security enterprise; 
however, even she dedicated an entire chapter, titled “Crossing an Academic No-Man’s 
Land,”19 to the scarcity of existing research on agency adaptation failure.  
Zegart crosses this no-man’s land by blending organizational theory and political 
science to assess why intelligence agencies could not adapt to the changing threats they 
faced before 9/11, and why were resistant to change in spite of the imperatives of post-
9/11 reforms. Her argument is that the nature of organizations, self-interest of political 
officials, and the fragmented nature of the federal government all militate against 
reform.20 
The premise that cultural and bureaucratic barriers between intelligence and 
investigative agencies were two precursors of the failures of imagination before 9/11 has 
been evinced by many studies in Congress, academia, and the press. Most convincingly, 
the eleventh chapter of the 9/11 Commission Report details examples of how 
“institutionalizing imagination” could have synthesized the disparate leads and strings of 
available data that may have revealed the 9/11 plot.21 
Congress responded to these findings with a massive reorganization of 
government that yielded the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of the 
                                                 
19 Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 43.  
20 Ibid., 9.  
21 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
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Director of National Intelligence, and a FBI that quadrupled the number of multiagency 
JTTFs under its supervision.22 
Advocates of these changes credit the recast homeland security enterprise, which 
realigned agencies under these new organizational structures and emphasized information 
sharing, for the absence of a large-scale terrorist attack within the United States since 
2001. Critics have cited the recent emergence of homegrown terror and a concomitant 
failure of the homeland security enterprise to thwart these lone wolf attacks, as indicators 
that even these reorganized entities remain one step behind contemporary threats.  
A 2011 U.S. Senate report took direct aim at the FBI’s JTTFs for their inability to 
disrupt the terrorist attack at Fort Hood Army base in Texas. The committee’s account of 
the FBI’s “superficial inquiry” of the attacker, Nidal Hassan, recommended that the FBI 
accelerate its transformation into an intelligence-driven agency, integrate its field offices, 
fully utilize intelligence analysts, update its tradecraft, and that JTTFs ultimately “fulfill 
the FBI’s aspiration for them to become interagency information-sharing and operational 
coordination mechanisms.”23  
Critical to the Fort Hood failure was that in spite of the colocation of investigators 
and analysts within the JTTFs, interagency divisions persisted. Non-FBI participants in 
the JTTFs were prohibited complete access to critical databases and essential training, 
nor could they share information with their parent organizations. In essence, the JTTFs 
were acting as “appendages of the FBI.”24 
Criticism of the JTTFs has persisted after Fort Hood. For instance, a RAND 
report of a 2014 seminar on domestic intelligence collation and information sharing 
observed that JTTFs are the primary conduit for intelligence to move from local to 
federal law enforcement; however, intelligence did not flow in the opposite direction.25 
                                                 
22“Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed October 15, 2016, 
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces.  
23 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb, 45.  
24 Ibid., 74.  
25 Brian Michael Jenkins, Andrew Liepman, and Henry H. Willis, Identifying Enemies among Us: 
Evolving Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2014), 9–10.  
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In spite of this, the report acknowledged that the JTTF system works, albeit imperfectly, 
and remains the primary conduit between federal and local law enforcement.26  
Fusion centers have been an alternative conduit between federal agencies and 
their state and local counterparts to share and collectively analyze information. These 
centers, and their mission, are often confused with JTTFs. This confusion, and sometimes 
criticism, is frequent enough that DHS posts a webpage that carefully distinguishes the 
respective missions and characteristics and missions of fusion centers and the JTTFs.27 
According to DHS, the fundamental distinction between them is that fusion centers are 
vigilant concerning all-hazards, including terrorism, while JTTFs focus on 
counterterrorism exclusively.  
In a separate but closely linked website, DHS also distinguishes between fusion 
centers and FBI-led field intelligence groups (FIGs).28 Here too, DHS contrasts the all-
hazard posture of fusion centers against the FIGs’ purpose of supporting all FBI 
investigative efforts. The distinctions within these websites are clear, as it is on three 
other DHS websites that distinguish the purpose of fusion centers from other federal-local 
partnerships.29 However, the effort these websites make to distinguish these groups also 
begs the question, does DHS protest too much? 
A 2012 report from the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
appears to think so. The report painstakingly details deficiencies of fusion centers, 
describing outdated and uninformative reporting, a muddled chain-of-command structure, 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
27 “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed October 15, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces. 
28 Ibid.  
29 “FBI Field Intelligence Groups and Fusion Centers,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed December 1, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/building-law-enforcement-and-homeland-security-
partnerships.  
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and wasteful spending. The final chapter of the report goes so far as to consider that 
fusion centers may have hindered, rather than aided, federal counterterrorism efforts.30 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations certainly had a political axe to 
grind; subcommittee ranking-member, Republican Tom Coburn, proudly carried the 
moniker “Dr. No” for his reputation as a fiscal “hawk” who paid particular attention to 
duplicative and inefficient federal programs. Furthermore, the report itself admits that it 
focused on the utility of fusion centers to the federal government and counterterrorism 
and that it did not examine the utility of the centers to state and locals nor their ability to 
analyze other types of threats.31 Yet the report is another indication that in spite of 
intentions, multiagency task forces and fusion centers are imperfect mechanisms for 
producing coordinated threat analysis. 
2. Alternative Organizational Models and Methodologies to Detect 
Targeted Violence 
The examinations such as those by Zegart, Congress, and watchdog groups are 
helpful, but they tend to direct their focus toward agencies, while this thesis looks at the 
more discrete behavior within those agencies. The actions of agencies and policymakers 
certainly influence the decision making of investigators, but the story seems incomplete. 
What is deduced from the available evidence is that task forces and fusion centers are 
top-down constructs seeking to have their participants conform to a rigid framework. It is 
that imposed design that causes these entities, which are intended to transcend 
bureaucratic fault lines, to act like bureaucracies themselves. 
Social network analysis (SNA) speaks to the weakness of the top-down, centrally-
controlled design of collaboration vice autonomy in which independent actors volunteer 
to come together. Ted Lewis writes that autonomy leads to bottom-up evolution, in which 
                                                 
30 Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support for and Involvement in State 
and Local Fusion Centers—Majority and Minority Staff Report (Washington, DC: Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/investigative-report-criticizes-
counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at-state-and-local-intelligence-fusion-centers, 101–104.  
31 Ibid., 9.  
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networks grow and evolve based on local rules.32 SNA is a promising method to evaluate 
both the vulnerability of single-agency and task force approaches to threat analysis and 
the potential of an emergent system that evaluates threats over a multiplicity of 
evaluators. Lewis writes that with networks, function follows form. This means that real-
world phenomena behave the way they do because of their network structure.33  
SNA also speaks to the value of a widely distributed and loosely -connected 
network of analysts as an alternative to the regimented design of the investigative squad, 
field office, or task force. Mark Granovetter researched social networks and emphasized 
the importance of those on the periphery of a network, which he called “weak ties” to 
adhere disparate, tightly-bound groups into a broad community.34 Paradoxically, strong 
social ties within groups may inhibit community organization; when groups become 
tightly bound at the expense of weaker social ties, the community organizes into 
unaligned cliques.35 
Granovetter considers earlier research examining whether innovators are 
generally marginal within a social network. In comparison to those who are more central 
and strongly linked to the group, those on the margins are less bound by convention.36 
Granovetter is equivocal about this question; however, more recent research takes this 
argument a step further. In combining the mathematics of networks and methodologies 
applied to linguistics, researchers Vittorio Loretto et al. theorize that the potential for 
innovation is more likely when ideas are arrayed in a networked structure. The authors 
apply the concept from biology of the adjacent possible to explain how unanticipated 
knowledge can emerge from centrality in a network of known evidence.37  
                                                 
32 Ted G. Lewis, Network Science: Theory and Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 1-
244, 299–430.  
33 Ibid., 9.  
34 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 
1364–1366, https://doi.org/10.1086/225469.  
35 Ibid., 1373–1374.  
36 Ibid., 1367–1368.  
37 Vittorio Loreto et al., “Dynamics of Expanding Spaces: Modelling the Emergence of Novelties,” in 
Creativity and Universality in Language, Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis Series, ed. Mirko Degli Esposti, 
Eduardo G. Altmann, and François Pachet, 59–83 (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2016).  
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In a more narrative sense, in Change by Design, Tim Brown describes how the 
emergence of an idea, or in this case good decision making, is encouraged through 
effective organizational design. In describing the concept of design thinking, Brown 
points out that a self-propagating idea changes behavior, perceptions, and attitudes; 
however, he also recognizes that this approach militates against top-down authority and 
centralized administration.38 In approaching an investigation as a type of innovation, 
wherein the unanticipated is revealed through the networked propagation of ideas, it is 
not difficult to imagine how threat analysis may benefit from a more distributed and 
networked approach.  
Other academic treatments of SNA observe how information can spread through a 
network like a contagion; this is what marketers call “going viral.” The homeland 
security enterprise was purposely built to facilitate information sharing; however, the 
deleterious effects of networked information need to be considered. Nicholas Christakis 
and James Fowler present the ominous observation that “the wisdom of crowds can 
quickly turn to folly.”39 Recent media coverage of “fake news” and the influence of 
social media on the 2016 presidential election may reinforce this point. If a certain 
network may produce better analysis, that same network under different conditions may 
reinforce or amplify falsehoods or bias. 
A method designed by Philip Tetlock, Dan Gardner and the Good Judgement 
Project may provide a way to balance broader strategic goals organizational imperatives. 
In Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction and its underlying research, 
Tetlock and Gardner found that dispersed teams of untrained, nonprofessionals could 
predict the outcomes of strategic-level questions better than colocated and cohesive 
                                                 
38 Tim Brown, Change by Design: How Design Thinking Transforms Organizations and Inspires 
Innovation (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 138.  
39 Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social 
Networks and How They Shape Our Lives (New York: Little Brown and Co., 2009), 140.  
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professional analysts.40 Amateur forecasters who used this method outperformed 
professional intelligence analysts by 30 percent.41  
The competition described in Superforecasting may point to the wisdom of 
crowds unto itself as a reason for the superior analysis of the amateur forecasters. These 
teams were comprised of talented individuals in their own fields, and it is possible that 
their collective knowledge eclipsed that of the agency-sponsored subject matter experts. 
Also, the networked structure of these teams may extend to sources of information that 
were more predictive than the classified information the agency teams used. The authors 
suspect that other forces also contributed to this success. Referencing the works of Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on availability heuristics, the Superforecasting authors 
argue that the agglomeration of intelligence in a particular field does not necessarily 
contribute to accurate prediction.42  
Superforecasting also refers to the seminal work on groupthink by Irving Janis to 
contemplate the vulnerability of small groups. Janis states, “members of any small 
cohesive group tend to maintain esprit de corps by unconsciously developing a number of 
shared illusions and related norms that interfere with critical thinking and reality 
testing.”43 This tendency for what Janis calls “concurrence seeking behavior” in groups 
may explain the susceptibility of task forces to poor decision making.44 Without 
deliberate steps to counter it, such as predesigned dissent and debate and the introduction 
of outside opinion, cohesive groups will fall into the trap of groupthink. In this sense, 
Janis echoes the insights of Granovetter in his examination of social networks, but he 
sees a more insidious consequence from a group that eschews outside influences. 
According to Janis,  
                                                 
40 Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: 
Crown, 2016), 94–99.  
41 David Ignatius, “More Chatter Than Needed,” Washington Post, November 1, 2013.  
42 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 51–52, 109.  
43 Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 20, quoted in Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, 
Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Crown, 2016), 196.  
44 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 9.  
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Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, 
and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures. . .[The 
consequences of bad decision making from groupthink] deserved to be 
fiascoes because of the grossly inadequate way the policymakers carried 
out decision-making tasks.45 
Task forces, by name and design, assemble subject matter experts together to 
address a specific challenge, but the insights of Janis, Tversky and Kahneman, and their 
intellectual progeny—Tetlock and Gardner—indicate that the deep expertise of task 
forces makes them less able to adapt when their intended task changes. A networked 
approach may favor better threat analysis, but it also signals a break from 
recommendations of Zegart and the Senate’s Fort Hood report to centralize the FBI. This 
illuminates the paradox of teams and centralized control—they can amass an array of 
talents, but they can also impose consensus to the point where the benefits from that 
diversity of thought are eclipsed by central control. Where the appropriate balance lies 
goes to the heart of this research.  
This thesis tests the accuracy of superforecasting with threat analysis. It examines 
whether a networked method, which in Superforecasting trained the collective analysis of 
the crowd toward large-scale longitudinal questions, will be effective when applied to 
situations that are ephemeral and immediate.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines whether a networked “crowdsourcing” method of threat 
analysis produces a more complete and accurate assessment of targeted violence suspects 
than current methods that are compartmentalized within a single organization. 
Crowdsourcing analysis would take individual threat assessments, then distill that 
assessment into a very brief synopsis, which would be sent to a large number of vetted 
analysts. These analysts could be local and federal investigators, intelligence analysts, 
social scientists, teachers, health care professionals, and any other field that may have a 
nexus into targeted violence investigations. If the results of this technique are similar to 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 9–10.  
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those described in Superforecasting,46 the diversity of the analytical group and their 
strength in numbers would analyze threat cases with improved fidelity compared to a 
single-agency method.  
In superforecasting competitions, analysts and amateur teams registered 
probabilities that hypothetical scenarios would occur within the span of the competition. 
These probabilities were then scored not only on their binary accuracy (i.e., it happened 
or it did not) but on their precision. This meant that a forecaster who gave a 75 percent 
probability for an event that ultimately occurred would receive a higher score than 
somebody who gave that outcome a 60 percent probability. Conversely, if the event did 
not occur, the forecaster who predicted 75 percent in favor would endure a larger penalty 
than the forecaster who predicted 60 percent.47 
This competition could be replicated for the thesis using past cases of targeted 
violence. Information for most of these cases is publically available through agency case 
studies, and databases such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database. Additional descriptive data may be 
found through the NTAC. Research subjects could then analyze these cases studies and 
score them.  
1. Limits 
The scope of this thesis was to test the hypothesis that a superforecasting 
methodology will produce more thorough, accurate, and predictive analysis than that of a 
single organization. The research was framed by the assumption that lone actor violence 
detectable and actionable, even when the subject of an investigation has not yet violated 
the law.  
A second assumption was that missed opportunities to stop acts of violence were 
the result of inherent institutional and cognitive vulnerabilities. These failures were not 
the consequence of inadequate information about the subject or individual failings of an 
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investigator, rather, they were the consequence of detecting a randomly occurring and 
complex event with a single organization, Whether the organization was an agency or 
task force, the critical decision to investigate further was limited to a single entity, 
thereby creating a single point of failure. To address this single point of failure, the 
researcher assumed that a broadly networked array of agencies and organizations, which 
engages a multiplicity of talents and perspectives, would produce better analysis and 
intervention strategies than the current single agency and task force models. 
2. Data Sources 
Data for the statistical analysis of lone actor attacks and an experimental 
superforecasting survey derived from unclassified, publically available case studies, the 
START Global Terrorism Database, and news accounts of targeted violence incidents. I 
then distilled the cases into synopses that form the bases for data collection. Analysts 
then analyzed and scored the synopses.  
3. Type and Mode of Analysis 
The thesis analyzed data through quantitative analysis of past lone actor events, a 
Monte Carlo simulation, and a survey simulating the superforecasting methodology. The 
quantitative analysis detected any patterns in the time series data, or in the absence of 
such patterns, established the randomness of lone actor attacks. The Monte Carlo 
simulations tested different decision-making protocols against a randomly occurring 
series of events.  
In addition to the quantitative analysis of attack data, this research also includes 
an experimental survey. The survey evaluated the superforecasting methodology through 
the analysis of scores participants gave to threat synopses. A Brier score evaluated the 
precision of participant scoring of the survey threat scenarios. This score enabled a test of 
the hypothesis that the networked interagency analysts produce results that are 
significantly different than the investigative agencies or chance. Additional questions 
within the survey produced output that illustrated how analysts reached decisions, what 
within the scenarios interested them, and why. In this sense, it presents an opportunity to 
analyze the analysts.  
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. DEFINITION OF LONE ACTOR VIOLENCE 
Defining of lone actor violence is a challenging task for the researcher and 
practitioner alike. Conflating acts such as “lone wolf terrorist,” “mass shooter,” and 
“assassin” may risk a disregard of the different tactics, targets, and motives of these 
attacks. However, to consider each too distinctly may draw the boundaries too close, 
thereby leading practitioners to disregard concerning precursors that do not conform to 
their definition, or a legal and jurisdictional one, of who is a terrorist, a mass shooter, or 
an assassin. To make such distinctions ignores some commonalities that may be shared 
across these different acts, regardless of the stated motive of the attacker. 
This debate continues among policymakers and the public. In the case of Nidal 
Hassan, in many ways the prototypical American lone-wolf terrorist, this question was 
the topic of fierce debate within Congress and between Congress and the Executive 
Branch. Some policymakers and pundits characterized Hassan’s attack at Fort Hood as 
workplace violence, a case of “going postal” with an Islamist veneer, while others 
impugned the workplace violence characterization as “political correctness” and extended 
that argument to imply that by not characterizing Hassan’s behavior properly, his 
colleagues and investigators failed to recognize an emerging terrorist in their midst. 
This debate may have been a distinction without a difference: Hassan behaved in 
a manner concerning to his colleagues and communicated with a known terrorist. These 
behaviors alone should have elicited curiosity from either his colleagues or investigators, 
as they were unusual for an Army officer. For his colleagues to frame his behavior as: 
“are these things which should warrant discipline?” or for investigators to frame it as: 
“are these things that indicate he is a terrorist?” prohibited either from recognizing that 
Hassan was rapidly becoming untethered from his life and may have been on the path to 
commit violence. 
The debate over the label of “terrorist” in the context of lone actors also illustrates 
the hazard of reverse causation. With Hassan and subsequent attackers proclaiming an 
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affiliation with a terrorist group, there is an associated assumption that those groups 
assisted, or at least encouraged, the attacker; however, evidence of such encouragement is 
sparse in American lone wolves. Instead, these appear to be actors who develop an urge 
to kill first and then seek a purpose for the killing afterwards.  
Similar debates have followed attempted and successful presidential 
assassinations. Although the story of the first presidential assassin, John Wilkes Booth, 
positions him as the center of a wider Confederate conspiracy, and James Garfield’s 
assassin, Charles Guiteau, is assumed to have been mentally ill, the motives of the two 
twentieth century assassins are less clear. William McKinley’s assassin Leon Czolgosz is 
consistently described as an anarchist, and he also had a history of mental illness.48 The 
killing of Lee Harvey Oswald two days after he assassinated John F. Kennedy destroyed 
any possibility of hearing his account for his motives; however, his avowed belief in 
Marxism and the meandering path of his life produced ample material for countless 
theories that try to ascribe a conspiratorial motive for the assassination. 
The attribution of “domestic terrorists” to a larger movement is less strong. The 
motives of school shooters are even less so, possibly by nature of their youth. However, 
the description of the motives attributed to many of the more notorious actors in both 
groups often alludes to philosophy that is often framed as the cause, rather than a 
consequence, of their pathos.  
Considered in their entirety, lone wolf terrorists, assassins, domestic terrorists, 
and school shooters share common characteristics in their respective paths to violence; it 
is their ascribed motive of the attack that distinguishes them. These commonalities form 
the basis of the definition, used by this thesis, which derives from the NTAC’s study of 
targeted violence, “Targeted violence is an incident of violence where a known or 
knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack.”49 
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For the purposes of this analysis, this definition is expanded and defined in the 
following way: 
• The actor attacked in a targeted manner. In accordance with the NTAC 
definition, the attack was not sudden nor was it impulsive.50 
• The attack involved one or a few actors and was not directed or 
supported by an outside group. Although the literal use of “lone actor” 
may be inaccurate, the term is kept to remain consistent with the literature 
and for the sake of concision. 
• The actor was detectable. The actor encountered law enforcement or 
another institution before the attack or was reported by a close associate 
before the attack. 
B. LONE ATTACKERS AND “ATTACK RELATED BEHAVIOR”—THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UNPREDICTABLE AND THE 
UNDETECTABLE 
An observer may perceive that single-actor violence is random, and an 
examination of related data may support that perception; however, it is important to 
distinguish between what is unpredictable and undetectable. The random nature of time 
series data on lone actor events analyzed in this chapter implies that these events are 
statistically independent, which means that the occurrence of an event is not the 
consequence of similar events that preceded it. In the context of lone actor investigations, 
this implies that the essential questions of who, where, and when cannot be extrapolated 
from earlier events attacks.  
Undetectable is a separate and distinct condition that is more forbidding for an 
investigator than the predictable. The next attack may not derive (in a statistical sense, at 
least) from earlier attacks; however, there may be common characteristics of past attacks 
and attacker that foretell the next one.  
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C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF LONE ACTOR VIOLENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES—THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF PREDICTING 
RANDOMNESS 
It may be argued that lone actor violence is random. To affirm the random 
character of lone actor violence, this thesis reviews and tests data on these attacks. The 
source of the data was the Global Terrorism Database, which is compiled by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).51 This 
data included attacks that involved three or fewer perpetrators and occurred in the United 
States between 1982–2017. An additional data set was compiled by Mother Jones 
magazine and then hand-filtered to exclude duplicates or events that were committed by 
groups. This combined set accounted for 190 incidents over 13030 days.52 
1. Using a “Runs Test” to Determine a Temporal Pattern in Lone Actor 
Attacks 
Once collected, the next step was to analyze the lone wolf data a statistical 
technique called the “runs test.” The runs test reviews a series of events with two distinct 
outcomes over time and determines whether that series exhibits a pattern.53 Any 
consecutive sequence where the same event occurs is considered a “run.” For example, if 
a fair coin was tossed five times, resulting in HHHTT, there would be two runs. The first 
run is three sequential flips of heads; the second is two sequential flips of tails. The total 
numbers of runs for either event is then counted, as is the number of individual times the 
either event occurred at all. Using these numbers one can determine a mean and variance 
and run a statistical “Z” test against the null hypothesis that the sample mean is not 
significantly different from the mean of a times series that is random.54 If the Z score is 
                                                 
51 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism 
Database [Data file], accessed November 5, 2017, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.  
52 Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen, and Deanna Pan, Mother Jones, November 15, 2017, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data/.  
53 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Runs Test for Detecting Non-Randomness,” in 
Engineering Statistics Handbook [online], last updated October 30, 2013, 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/eda/section3/eda35d.htm.  
54 A Z score test is described in “Hypothesis Testing,” Pennsylvania State University, accessed 
October 15, 2017, http://sites.stat.psu.edu/~ajw13/stat200_notes/09_hypoth/03_hypoth_proportion.htm.  
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sufficiently far from the mean (this is ± 1.96 at the 95 percent confidence level) then the 
null hypothesis (Ho) is rejected. 
Table 1.   Runs Test on Lone Actor Attack Time Series 
Runs Test for Daily Attacks 1/28/1982—10/1/2017 
Runs 
    n+ (incident) 189 mean 373.5175 
 n- (no incident) 12,842 var 10.6214 
 Runs (incident) 180 Z score=  -1.36682 
 Runs (no incident) 179 Accept Ho 
   
The Z score of the test in Table 1 is within the confidence interval of ±1.96, 
which suggests the null hypothesis is acceptable. By extension, this result supports that 
the onset of lone actor attacks within the tested time series follows a random pattern. This 
indicates that lone actors’ attacks are unlikely to follow a pattern that is predictable 
through quantitative analysis, and they are likely independent events.  
2. Time Series and Geospatial Analysis of Incidents over Time and 
Space 
Time series analysis determined whether there were any correlations between an 
incident and a period up to 365 days in the past. The result confirmed there was no 
statistically significant correlation between any day and a day 1 to 365 days prior. (See 
Appendix B for this analysis). This indicates that it is highly unlikely that a lone wolf 
attack has a statistical relationship with previous attacks within a year-long span. 
A similar analysis of the locations of events between 2013 and 2016 was the only 
span for which a complete data set on latitude and longitude of the events was available. 
As with the analysis of incidents over time, there was no statistical correlation on the 
latitudinal and longitudinal series. This indicates that the location of an attack does not 
predict the location of later attacks within this time frame. 
Considered together, the results of the runs test and the time series analysis 
indicates that lone wolf attacks between 1982 and 2017 were random over both time and 
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space. It is likely that one could intuit this argument without the use of statistical 
techniques. A cursory review of lone actor events shows that these events are driven by a 
wide array of motives, committed by a diverse group of perpetrators, and directed toward 
a dispersed number of targets. However, it is useful to attempt statistical treatment of the 
attacks, albeit simple ones, to eliminate potential detection tools and to buttress the case 
that these events are random and independent. 
3. Is Lone Actor Violence Detectable? 
In 1997, the United States Secret Service and the National Institute of Justice 
studied the histories of 83 people known to have attacked, or approached with intent to 
attack, a prominent person of public status in the United States from as early as 1949.55 
This Exceptional Case Study Project examined the traditional profile-based approach to 
these incidents and refuted that approach; however, the project asserted that assassination 
was the “end result of a discernable process of thinking and behavior.”56 In a subsequent 
report, Fein and Vosskuil explain that 
There are no accurate—or useful—descriptive, demographic, or 
psychological “profiles” of American assassins, attackers, and near-lethal 
approachers. …[The attackers studied] were both male and female, and 
ranged across ages, educational backgrounds, employment histories, 
marital status, and other demographic and background characteristics.57  
This distinction encapsulates the difference between a phenomenon that is unpredictable 
and one that is undetectable. Lacking a defined archetypical “profile” of an attacker 
renders the search for a definitive predictive model futile; however, identifying behaviors 
that may indicate a propensity toward violence makes detection of an attacker possible. 
The Exceptional Case Study Project also dismissed the prevailing wisdom that 
attackers were generally mentally ill, going so far as to state that “[a focus] on mental 
                                                 
55 Robert Fein and Bryan Vossekuil, Preventing Assassination: Secret Service Exceptional Case Study 
Project (Washington, DC: National Institute for Justice, 1997), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=167224, 1.  
56 Ibid., 41–44.  
57 Ibid., 1.  
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illness is not useful for those with responsibilities to prevent attacks.”58 The study 
suggests that this characterization derives from the logic that attacking a political leader 
is irrational because that leader can be removed from office peacefully through elections, 
and the leader operates in a system succession where the her or his replacement would be 
ideologically similar. In addition, the study distinguishes here between behavior that may 
be socially repugnant, as assassination is, and behavior that is clinically pathological.59  
In the context of counterterrorism, other researchers have added to this premise. A 
2017 analysis of terrorist writings determined that terrorists are rarely emotionally or 
cognitively impaired; rather, they generally exhibit a high level of negative emotions, 
anger, and cognitive flexibility.60 In an earlier study of 98 lone actor terrorists in Europe 
by the Countering Lone Actor Terrorism Project (CLAT), 35 percent of subjects 
exhibited mental health issues compared to a World Health Organization estimate of 27 
percent for the population at large. 61  
The more recent research on terrorism and the Exceptional Case Study agree that 
the perpetrators of lone actor violence do not share a consistent profile and eschew the 
assumption that such violence is, per se, a consequence of mental health issues. However, 
none of these studies describe the emergence of lone actor violence as undetectable. The 
Exceptional Case Study describes a “downward spiral” in the lives of many attackers but 
asserts that planning and undertaking an attack was the consequence of rational 
behavior.62 The more recent linguistic study of lone actor terrorists describes their 
communications as representative of sophisticated but highly angry, categorical, and 
causally-integrated.63 The final characteristic means that attackers often assessed a causal 
58 Ibid., 71. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Stephane Baele, “Lone Actor Terrorist’s Emotions and Cognition: An Evaluation Beyond 
Stereotypes,” Political Psychology 38, no. 3 (2017): 449, doi: 10.1111/pops.12365.  
61 Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, “Analyzing Personal Characteristics of Lone-
Actor Terrorists: Research Findings and Recommendations,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 2 (2016): 
45, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/44250/PersonalCharacteristics-
PoT.pdf?sequence=1.  
62 Fein and Vosskuil, Preventing Assassination, 48, 75. 
63 Baele “Lone Actor Terrorists,” 465. 
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linkage between the object of their anger and their own grief—what is colloquially 
referred to as “conspiracy theories.” 
None of these studies discard the idea that terrorism can be detected, but the 
consistency of their findings demonstrates the hazards of stereotyping. Attackers derive 
from a full range of backgrounds, are male and female, are young and old, and are 
motivated by ideas that may originate from a broader public movement but can also 
derive from personal grievances. Yet across this diversity of profiles, attackers do 
consistently demonstrate actions and thoughts that signal their intentions. A companion 
analysis of the 2016 CLAT study noted that changes in behavior prior to the attack, 
including “leakage behavior,” wherein the perpetrator would express extreme views or an 
intention to commit violence to a third party.64  
4. Legal Considerations—What Is a Threat?
When investigating potential lone actor violence, law enforcement agencies are 
faced with several legal obstacles. By definition, the lone actor does not rely on a larger 
conspiracy, and as such, the ultimate act of violence is not supported with other predicate 
crimes such as money laundering, arms trafficking, possession of banned substances, or 
other illegal acts. Confounding this further is that some of the actions a lone actor takes in 
preparation for a violent act are legal and constitutionally protected, such as endorsing 
certain beliefs or owning a firearm. Instead, investigators must rely on the expression of 
intent through a threat to arrest, and falling short of that, they must seek other methods to 
intervene. Threats in this context are unique in that they must be communicated; 
therefore, an investigator or prosecutor must discern where Frist Amendment protected 
freedom of speech ends and the crime begins. 
The federal laws most germane to targeted violence are 18 U.S.C. § 871, Threats 
Against the President and Successors to the Presidency, which forbids “any threat to take 
the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the 
64 Clare Ellis et al., “Analyzing the Process of Lone Actor Terrorism: Research Findings,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 2 (2016): 36–37, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/44254. 
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President-elect.”65 Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) Interstate Communications, forbids 
“any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure 
the person of another.”66 
Application of these laws has sometimes relied on the assumption that the 
communication, unto itself, was the crime. A 2015 Supreme Court decision Elonis v. 
United States rejected this assumption. The petitioner, Anthony Douglas Elonis, was 
arrested after posting a Facebook threat where he declared he would shoot his estranged 
wife and “slit her throat.”67 Elonis admitted to making the declaration but claimed that it 
was an imitation of a rapper who he admired. In an 8–1 decision, the court decided in 
favor of Elonis, determining that a threat required not only the communication but the 
intent to do harm.  
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, 
[C]ommunicating something is not what makes the conduct “wrongful.” 
Here [quoting an earlier case] “the crucial element separating legal 
innocence from wrongful conduct” is the threatening nature of the 
communication. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the 
fact that the communication contains a threat.68 
Roberts’s opinion relied on three definitions of threat to frame this argument: 1) 
“to declare (usually conditionally) one’s intention of inflicting injury upon;” “an 
expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means;” and “[a] 
communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another”.69 Application of 18 U.S.C. § 
871 is similarly challenging. When a celebrity performs a mock execution, holding the 
head of the president in the manner of a terrorist propaganda video and disseminates it 
broadly online, it is regarded as provocative to everyone who views it, offensive to many, 
and potentially illegal to a few. Even fewer may regard the celebrity as a physical threat 
to the world leader, even though the images are a graphic imitation of a murder.  
                                                 
65 18 U.S.C. § 871.  
66 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  
67 Elonis v. United States, 575 S. Ct. 983 (2015).  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
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Considered alone, the physical threat to the world leader may be small, but the 
investigator must also consider the precedent set if the case is disregarded. The 
investigator must consider how the same communication would be perceived and the risk 
it presents if a heretofore-unknown person made it. The history of the celebrity might be 
publically available, allowing the investigator to put the communication into context with 
other controversial statements that person may have made. It would also be difficult to 
imagine a celebrity gaining the necessary access to the leader to kill him or her without 
being recognized. It is easier to consider the performance as provocative speech and 
nothing more. The unknown subject who performs the mock beheading lacks that 
mitigating context. Reaching the decision to investigate a case further involves a difficult 
triangulation between common sense, fairness, and public credibility.  
5. Decision Making of the Investigator 
Targeted violence may be detectible, but it is random and unpredictable. Lone 
actor attacks are salient to the public, but the legal definition of a threat is particular and 
prohibitive of law enforcement intervention. Given these circumstances, it is not difficult 
to be sympathetic toward the investigator who is faced with a decision of whether to 
move forward with a prolonged investigation or to close the case and move on.  
To the law enforcement agency, this decision is not trivial. Any decision to move 
forward in an investigation carries the cost of time and other resources, an investment 
that comes at the opportunity cost of dedicating those scarce resources elsewhere. 
Continuing with a case also carries the risk of allegations that the investigative agency 
has violated the suspect’s civil rights. From a purely probabilistic standpoint, this risk 
may be greater than the risk of the attack itself. Indicators of an impending threat include 
language that may indicate violence and access to weapons; however, these behaviors 
abut constitutionally protected rights. More often than not, a person who utters 
threatening speech does not commit violence, and a person who stockpiles weapons may 
not ever turn them on another person. 
These narrow boundaries may inhibit investigators’ propensity to investigate 
further unto themselves, but the steady stream of false leads may amplify these effects. In 
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emergency medicine, this is commonly called alarm fatigue, whereby the steady 
feedback of alarms that are not urgent can numb the reaction time of a caregiver.70 It may 
be that the investigators, faced with the steady stream of false positives, will slowly 
reduce their vigilance toward future threats.  
The possibility of previous outcomes affecting decision-making is further 
supported by Bayesian confirmation theory. Bayes’s theorem proposes that the final 
probability of a hypothesis (in this case that a case in present time warrants further 
investigation) is a dividend of a probability presented by an initial hypothesis by the 
probability presented by additional evidence (every preceding investigation that is 
perceived to be either valid or not).71 In his Treatise on Probability, Keynes explains the 
effect of evidence on an initial estimate of probability further, stating: 
In ordinary language we may assert that, according to our rule, the 
addition to our evidence of a single fact always has a definite bearing on 
our conclusion. It either leaves its probability unaffected and is irrelevant, 
or it has a definitely favourable or unfavourable bearing, being favourably 
or unfavourably relevant.72 
Given these approaches to probability, it may be that an investigator’s vigilance toward 
new threats steadily decomposes after a lengthy stream of false leads. 
Other research asserts that people are, in fact, poor judges of probability. Abias 
researchers call the gambler’s fallacy describes the tendency of decision makers, such as 
mortgage adjusters, baseball umpires, and gamblers themselves, to misjudge the 
probability of a future event based on the outcome of recent events. According to the 
research, this effect is most pronounced when an event is assumed to be random, such as 
70 Mike Mitka, “Joint Commission Warns of Alarm Fatigue: Multitude of Alarms from Monitoring 
Devices Problematic,” JAMA 309, no. 22 (2013): 2315–2316, doi:10.1001.  
71 William Talbott, “Bayesian Epistemology,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, winter 2016 
ed., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-bayesian, 8–9; James Joyce, “Bayes’ 
Theorem,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 ed., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/bayes-theorem/, 2–4.  
72 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability: Full Text of 1921 Edition (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1921), Kindle ed., Chapter VI, location 1971.  
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a coin toss. 73 When a series of many tosses produce the same result, such as when that 
coin lands on “heads” several times in a row, the gamblers fallacy predicts that an 
observer will adjust his or her estimate of the next outcome in the other direction, 
believing that the run of previous events foretells such an adjustment.74 This research 
detected the effect in decision making, quantifying a five percent difference in decisions 
as varied as whether an undocumented immigrant would receive asylum, whether an 
applicant would receive a loan, or a Major League batter received a called strike or a 
ball.75 Although this behavior may appear to counter the concept of alarm fatigue and 
possibly Bayesian thinking generally, it is consistent with the idea that previous outcomes 
will affect future decisions.  
6. Treatment of Lone Actor Events and Investigative Decision-Making 
from a Probabilistic Perspective
Approaching both lone actor events and the decision to investigate as a purely 
probabilistic phenomenon permits a contrast to the more complex motives and decision 
making extant with both. It is highly unlikely that either the attacker or investigator 
approach their actions as roll of the dice; however, a purely probabilistic examination 
illustrates the scale of the problem, provides a means to bench test different decision-
making processes, and provides a baseline from which to contrast the actual decisions 
that are taking place. 
The research on lone actor violence, which illustrates that there is no consistent 
profile or motive for a lone actor to attack, further validates a probabilistic approach. The 
time series and geospatial examination of lone actor violence adds evidence that the 
emergence of an attack is stochastic. By modeling the onset of an attack in a purely 
probabilistic way, the challenge to an investigator can be illustrated and quantified.  
73 Daniel Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Kelly Shue, “Decision-making under the Gambler’s 
Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, and Baseball Umpires” (working paper, NBER 
Working Paper Series, National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, DC, 2016), 




From the investigator’s perspective, the propensity to investigate can be modeled 
in different ways and compared to one another. For example, a model where a certain 
proportion of leads are investigated can be considered against other formulas that model 
both an alarm fatigue and a gambler’s fallacy scenario. In the latter models, the decision 
to investigate or not would begin at one hundred percent and with rise or fall based on 
preceding outcomes. 
Together, these decision-making processes were simulated using the Monte Carlo 
method. A Monte Carlo model simulated the occurrence of attacks at random intervals 
over time. Coinciding with the simulated onset of attacks was a simulated detection of 
that threat. Finally, the model applied different decision-making protocols to determine 
how many times an attack emerged, was detected, and ultimately, investigated. 
7. Monte Carlo Simulations 
Using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet produced three decision making models. The 
intension of this sheet modeled a time period similar in length, 13030 days, to the time 
series analyzed earlier in this section (January 22, 1982 through October 1, 2017). The 
simulation used a random number generating formula within Excel. The researcher 
considered any random number that that was less than or equal to the specified 
probability for the event an “attack” and assigned the value 1. The researcher considered 
any event that exceeded the probability a non-event and assigned the value 0. This 
combined set accounted for 190 incidents over 13030 days; therefore, probability for an 
attack, on any given day, was set at 190/13030 = Pattack = .01458. This probability was 
used for all models for the attack side of the simulation.  
Probability for detection was 0.7 (70 percent). The basis of this probability 
derives from the NTAC observation that 74 percent of lone actor attackers encountered 
law enforcement or other institutions before they attacked; however, not all of the 
encounters could be construed as related to the attack.76 To account for this the NTAC 
statistic was deflated to 70 percent. 
                                                 
76 National Threat Assessment Center, Attacks on Federal Government, 24.  
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Four separate simulations tested different decision-making dynamics. The first 
simulation, titled “Rapidly Diminishing Vigilance,” was based on the assumption that an 
investigator’s perception of a lead at time t is determined by her or his perception the 
previous day t-1 and the ratio of events to non-events. This probability began at 100 
percent at day one. On subsequent days, the probability adjusted based on an average of 
the probability the day before and the ratio of outcomes where an attack occurred to 
outcomes where it did not.  
Rapidly diminishing probability formula: 77 
1) Let 𝑡𝑡 =  the days in this simulation =  (1, 2, 3, . . . 13,030) 
2) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎′𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 









The second simulation, titled “Reactive Vigilance,” builds upon the assumptions 
of the “Rapidly Diminishing” equation but adds an assumption that investigators will 
increase their vigilance and their propensity to open an investigation after an attack has 
occurred. With this assumption in mind, the probability will rise after an attack, then 
diminish, in a wave-like plot.  
Reactive vigilance equation:78 









The third simulation, titled “Gambler’s Fallacy,” adjusts the investigators 
decision-making whenever there is a sequence of five or more previous decisions to not 
investigate. The research of Chen et al. estimated that the decision makers they studied 
were five percent more likely than chance to change their decision in the opposite 
direction following a sequence of the same decision.79 Using this five percent estimate, 
the “Gambler’s Fallacy” is a two-step equation: the first is Equation 1, the second is an 
increase of 1.05 for every decision that follows until the decision changes. 
                                                 
77 The function is represented as an Excel formula like this (assuming it is within row# 3, representing 
Day 2, and looking back at row#2, representing Day 1): 
G2/2+((COUNTIF(C$2:C2,1)/COUNTIF(C$2:C2,0))/2).  
78 The function is represented as an Excel formula like this (assuming it is within row# 3, representing 
Day 2, and looking back at row#2, representing Day 
1):IF(C2=1,1,G2/2+(I$1*(COUNTIF(C$2:C2,1)/COUNTIF(C$2:C2,0))/2)).  
79 Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue, “Decision-making under the Gambler’s Fallacy,” 1.  
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The fourth simulation is the simplest, “Investigate Everything that is Detected.” 
This simulation assumes the investigators will open a following investigation for every 
investigative lead they receive. 
The Monte Carlo simulation estimated a cost statistic for outcomes with an attack, 
which yielded a cost, or detection and an investigation, which yielded a benefit (or 
negative cost). Additionally, a causality statistic was estimated any time an attack 
occurred. Like the occurrence of attacks, detections, and investigations, the number of 
casualties and associated economic costs were based on random number generators 
within the model; however, the distributions of the random numbers were different for 
the casualties and costs. The random numbers for the attacks, detections, and 
investigations were evenly distributed, which means that any number between zero and 
one was equally likely. Using an even distribution was appropriate because the likelihood 
of any of those events relied on their underlying probability. The casualties from actual 
lone actor attacks vary widely, with many attacks that have small numbers of casualties 
and fewer attacks with large numbers of casualties. This means the distribution of 
casualties is not even, where an equal number of attacks result in any number of 
casualties, nor are they normal, where attacks most frequently result in the mean number 
of casualties and an equal number of attacks with casualties that are higher or lower than 
the mean occur less frequently. Given this skewness, the random numbers that the model 
generated for casualties was adjusted so, like the actual attacks, many small casualty 
attacks and occasional mass casualty attacks occurred. 
To determine the appropriate degree of skewness in the simulated casualties, the 
researcher derived mean and standard deviations from the historical data for fatalities and 
non-fatal injuries over 190 incidents. A histogram for these statistics showed a positive 
(rightward) skew, and thus, did not have a normal distribution. This is explained by a 
cursory review of the casualty rates. Attacks were most frequent in the low single-digits 
(1 to 5 for fatalities), yet there were several attacks with fatalities as high as 58. This 
leads to a frequency distribution that is “tall” in the low number but has a long, “fat” tail. 
Analysis of nonfatal injuries followed a similar pattern. To simulate casualties that would 
most often generate casualties that reflected this skewed distribution—many events with 
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single-digit results and occasional events with large results—a gamma distribution was 
applied to the random numbers associated with the fatality and non-fatal injury statistics. 
A random number generator using these skewed distributions generated the 
consequences of these events. For any occasion where there was an attack but no 
investigation, the simulation multiplied the number of fatalities by $7 million, which uses 
the economic “value of life” originally developed by Richard Thaler.80 For nonfatal 
casualties, the simulation deflated the number to 10 percent of the fatality value; 
$700,000. The effects were totaled, applying a coefficient of 1 for any successful attack, 
and -1 for any attack that was thwarted (i.e., attack attempted but investigation occurred, 
thereby yielding a “negative cost,” or said differently, a societal gain).  
The simulation ran each formula 13030 times, which represented each day in the 
time period of the sample. The simulation ran over five iterations for each scenario; Table 
2 shows these averages. As would be expected in a simulation that ran as many turns 
within each iteration (13030), the average number of attacks were at or very close to 189, 
ranging between 179 (just below 95 percent of the expected result) and 190.8 (only one 
percent above the expected result). The average of the detections should be expected to 
be the same across all models, 70 percent of 13030, which equals 9121 (here the range 
only varied by less than one percent in either direction). Finally, the fourth variable, 
which represents the instances where attacks were both detected and occurred, should be 
close to 70 percent of the total number of attacks (132.3), and again the spread in the 
results ranged vary close (five percent below to two percent above).  
It is in the remaining outcomes where the different models vary. For 
investigations opened, the number of cases opened varied widely, from 391.6 to 9164.4. 
This is to be expected. With the rapidly diminishing scenario, which is heavily dependent 
on the outcomes of earlier turns of the attack variable, the result was only slightly twice 
that of the attacks. Even a result that high is more a result of an averaging component—
the decision was based on prior outcomes and averaged with the probability of the earlier 
                                                 
80 Richard Thaler, “The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market,” in Household 
Production and Consumption, ed. Nestor E. Tereckyj (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic 
Research 1976), quoted in Richard Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2015), 15.  
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investigative decision. Absent that second component, the decision would be purely 
based on attack results themselves; therefore, after a certain number of turns running 
toward infinity, the probability to investigate should converge toward the probability of 
attack. In this model, the averaging effect makes it more responsive to recent attack/non-
attack outcomes, and as such, yielded a number that was significantly greater than the 
number of attacks themselves, yet still small. 

















Attacks 189 179 190.8 186.4 
Detections 9113 9096.4 9099.4 9124.4 
Investigations Opened 391.6 536.4 826 9124.4 
Attack and Detected 135 125.8 135.2 129 
Attack and Investigated 3 8.4 11.2 129 
Attack Detected and 
Investigated 2.2 6.8 7.4 129 
Fatalities 1002.4 1006.2 1109.6 300.4 
Nonfatal injury 2340.2 2342.2 2585 700.8 
Fatalities Prevented 17.2 43.8 76.4 689.8 
Injuries Prevented 39 102.4 177 1609.8 




0 $ (3,362,100,000) 
 
A consequence of the rapidly diminishing model’s very low number of 
investigations was the opportunity to detect and investigate, meaning the attack failed, 
was only 2.2. The difference between detected attacks and those subsequently 
investigated was 132.8. This represents the number of “false positives” wherein attackers 
would have encountered law enforcement—71 percent of all attacks in this model. 
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The intermediate models, reactive vigilance and gambler’s fallacy, both resolved 
with a greater number of investigations; therefore, they also yielded a larger number of 
thwarted attacks. Reactive vigilance resulted in a 37 percent increase in opened 
investigations, yet resulted in over three times as many thwarted attacks, on average.  
Gambler’s fallacy, which took the decision model of the rapidly diminishing 
model and then weighted it based on series of similar investigative decisions, made the 
decision at any point dependent on both the outcomes of attacks/non-attacks and previous 
decisions. This made the model’s greater number of investigations than rapidly 
diminishing unsurprising, and a result that was greater than reactive vigilance but only 
slightly so. What was surprising is that although the model was also efficient in this 
increase of thwarted attacks compared to greater investigations (211 percent more 
investigations compared to 336 percent more disrupted attacks), it was less efficient than 
reactive vigilance. This indicates that the relationship between thwarted attacks and 
increasing caseloads is nonlinear; progressively opening a greater number of 
investigations, though positively correlated, yields diminishing returns. 
Increasing caseload yields a diminishing benefit; however, it can yield a similar 
rate of false negatives (attacks detected but not investigated), and an increasing number 
of false positives (investigations that did not result in an attack). Rapidly diminishing, 
reactive vigilance, and gambler’s fallacy yielded false positive rates of 70 percent, 66.5 
percent and 67 percent, respectively. Contrasting this are the very low rates whereby 
attacks are disrupted: 1.6 percent, 4.7 percent and 5.9 percent. The remaining attacks are 
“bolts out of the clear blue sky;” the undetected surprise attacks that, under these 
hypothetical circumstances, went undetected and rounded out to 24.1%, 28.8 percent and 
27.1 percent.  
These results illustrate three characteristics of lone actor attacks that frustrate 
investigators. First, the strong effect of diminishing returns means that greater investment 
of resources and a concomitant increase in opportunity cost and exposure to liability will 
not necessarily yield an equivalent increase in benefits. A cursory review of the casualty 
rates and net economic costs from these attacks underscores this point; each of the 
models resulted in similar aggregate casualties and economic losses. Second, there will 
 39 
always be attacks that are true surprises, and that proportion may be large enough to draw 
the conclusion that many or all lone actor attacks are undetectable. Finally, the first three 
models demonstrate that regardless of the single investigative agency’s decision-making 
process, the outcome relies on the randomness of the event. Essentially, this is a game 
that relies more on the configuration of the dartboard, than the way the darts are thrown. 
With lone actor events, the bullseye occupies less than 1.5 percent of the board, which is 
the probability of an attack on a given day. 
The investigate everything discussion warrants examination but only as a 
representation of the most extreme case in which an investigative agency is adequately 
resourced to investigate every lead. In this model, every attack that is detected is 
investigated, and ultimately, thwarted. This yields significant benefits and resolves to a 
net economic impact that is a societal gain of $3.3 billion; however, two things should be 
considered. First, this number should be amortized over the 33-year span of the model. 
Second, this benefit also comes with the cost of almost 9000 investigations that are 
opened but do not resolve to an attack.  
Such a proportion means an average of almost five investigations-per-week would 
be false alarms. Furthermore, those false alarms come with their own costs. There are the 
already mentioned resource and opportunity costs as well as exposure to liabilities. In 
addition to these costs would be a cost that is difficult to quantify—the potential erosion 
of civil liberties. This effect is not trivial; investigative “fishing expeditions” were one 
reason that Congress imposed the “least intrusive means” restriction on intelligence 
operations within the United States and against U. S. citizens while abroad.81 
Considering more recent instances in which broad investigative authorities were later 
restricted, such as the FBI’s use of national security letters in the early 2000s, it is likely 
that a 9000 to 189 ratio of invalid investigations to valid ones would offend public 
sensibilities. 
These models are limited in their consideration of ancillary effects of 
investigative decisions. They do not capture nor quantify public opinion on either side of 
                                                 
81 Exec. Order No. 12333, C.F.R. 3 (1981), https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12333.html, 200.  
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the margins, which is the salience of attacks when they occur and the effect of overly-
intrusive investigations when attacks do not occur. The models also do not assess the 
potential costs, whether opportunity costs or civil liabilities, which may occur from false 
alarms. In spite of the absence of these costs from the models, the frequency of the events 
that produce them remains. Through additional research, a more complete net effect of 
these costs could be added to these models and a more complete net cost estimate could 
be produced. 
The scale of the models is another over simplification, albeit a deliberate one. 
This model was scaled to present a problem where the probability of attack was set for an 
attack on a particular day with no regard to population size or geographical extent. 
Models could be built that approach either probability of attack, whether it was the 
number of attacks in a given period divided by the total population of the United States, 
or the number of attacks divided by a predetermined ratio of the surface area that is 
determined to be affected by an attack to the surface area of the United States. Either of 
these possibilities would require a larger number of cycles—far greater than the chosen 
13030; however, the results of the models, and the differences between them, would 
begin to resemble those of the models used for this report, which relied on day-to-day 
events and a single investigative entity as the decision- maker. 
Detection and decision making are also severely simplified in this model. It is 
highly unlikely that investigators play darts with investigation decisions, nor do they roll 
dice with 10 sides in terms of detection, or 30 to 100 sides to decide whether to 
investigate a threat. In reality, the presence of evidence that indicates the potential for an 
attack will certainly influence both detection and decision making and would produce a 
much more complex model. Future models could consider this effect by simulating the 
issue of an indicator by the attacker, and the chance of detection by the investigator, or by 
building a decision-making equation that is more responsive to that indicator by the 
investigator or both.  
The advantage of simplified models, scaled to a moderate size, is that variables 
can be isolated with the assumption that the other, more complex variables are 
encompassed in the more general relationships that are tested. Also, the interplay between 
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the decision parameters the researcher selects selected and randomness is observable. 
With the models selected, the general conclusion is that given the very low probability on 
a given day of an attack, decision making that is dependent on the frequency of that event 
in earlier days will yield modestly improved benefits if they are calibrated properly; 
however, that improvement will come at a much faster frequency of false positives. The 
results also help explain the frequency of pre-attack encounters between law enforcement 
and perpetrators; with the exception of the extreme investigate everything model, this 
happened far more frequently than successful investigations.  
These findings suggest that randomness itself may contribute to the decisions 
investigators make. If an investigator seeks literal “hard” evidence that an attack will 
occur and does not find it, then there is little wisdom in investigating further if the 
ultimate goal is arrest, wherein due process obligates a high evidentiary standard. If the 
decision is framed by earlier outcomes, then the lack of evidence can provide an 
immediate reason to end an investigation. The organizational imperatives to produce 
arrests and the consequences of false positives may amplify one another and reduce the 
impetus to commit resources to a less compelling case. 
If a less intrusive approach of managing potential risk is the endpoint, such as 
various intervention strategies that do not involve arrest, then the due process threshold 
may be reduced or eliminated; however, the challenge of decision making is not. In 
returning to the models, if the instances in which a suspect is investigated but would not 
attack are reframed from false arrests and intrusive investigations to simply false 
positives, the consequences of these errors are reduced but still come at a cost. With more 
“soft” strategies, such as countering violent extremism programs, the cost might be 
reduced confidence in the program. With the intervention of mental health professionals, 
it may be the overuse of a scarce resource. These outcomes obligate a decision-making 
model that is more precise than investigate everything but is more inclusive and complex 
than the other three models. 
The models also illustrate the hazards of a single source of decision making, as 
they use a single decision-making node. This is not revelatory—the 9/11 Commission 
identified the “siloing” of decision making within the FBI as a contributing factor in the 
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failure to interdict the 9/11 attackers, and the Senate’s examination of the Fort Hood 
attack showed the colocation of a more diverse group of analysts within decision-making 
task forces to have their own decision-making choke point. A single point of decision 
may present a single point of failure.  
Soft strategies are inherently interdisciplinary; indeed, they rely on professions 
with different areas of expertise and their resources come from organizations with 
different imperatives. It is possible that the decision to commit to a long-term 
intervention strategy would benefit from insights that these various backgrounds can 
provide. For example, a potential attacker may show certain indicators considered 
concerning to some within an analytical forum and less so to others, but in aggregate, 
produce a more appropriate reflection of the risk the potential attacker presents than a 
single opinion. There are other experiments that have tested the accuracy of aggregated 
estimates, ranging from something as simple as many individual guesses of the number of 
pennies in a jar to the meta-analysis of multiple presidential election polls into a model 
that is more predictive than any of them were individually.82 It is this principle tested in 
the following experiment, which uses the superforecasting technique to assess potential 
lone actor threats. 
 
 
                                                 
82 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of the Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), quoted in Daniel 
Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 84.  
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IV. THE SUPERFORECASTING EXPERIMENT 
A. SURVEY AND RESULTS 
This research includes an online survey, from November 13 to December 1, 2017, 
with nine participating subjects. The intention of this survey was twofold. The first is to 
compare the risk assessments by a group of analysts of past incidents of lone actor or 
violence. The second intent is to present the participating subjects with broad 
hypothetical “prospects” in a threat assessment context to assess their overall sensitivity 
to risk. (See Appendix C for a description of the questionnaire describing this self-
assessment).  
Table 3.   Professional Experience of Nine Participants in the Survey 
Profession Number * Years of 
Experience 




Law enforcement  6 2–31 17.5 
Fire department or EMS  2 3–16 9.5 
Military 0 n/a n/a 
Medicine or Public Health  2 6–18 12 
Social Worker  1 1 1 
Other (see Appendix B for a 
complete list)  5 1–10 6.2 
 Total: 180 20 
* There were only nine subjects in the survey; however, some of them had experience in two or 
more of the professions listed in Table 3. For this table, all of the experience is accounted for. For 
the calculation of data results, the experience was allocated for each individual for questions 1 
and 3 through 6. For question 2, the risk probability question, a single profession was used to 
avoid skewing the results of that data. 
 
The researcher recruited from the Naval Postgraduate School, from professional 
contacts, and by word-of-mouth. Subjects received and invitations by email and 
completed the survey with an online platform called LimeSurvey. 
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B. SURVEY PART ONE—SCENARIOS 
The subjects viewed five cases of targeted violence. The selected cases were 
based on the availability of public information about the attackers—no information 
appearing in the scenarios derived from classified sources or those unavailable to the 
public. Also, the researcher selected the cases to represent at least one example of a “lone 
wolf terrorist,” an assassin, and a school shooter. This information was synopsized and 
redacted to simulate two conditions: 1) the information in a networked analysis system, 
which would need to be filtered in order to be disseminated, and 2) information that was 
ultimately disseminated would usually be incomplete.  
To meet the first condition, it was assumed that any broad network of analysts 
would have varying levels of access to data; therefore, any information distributed over 
such a wide system would require filtering of personally identifiable information of the 
person investigated as well as any information gained through classified means, grand 
jury subpoenas, access to health records, or other private data. Second, it was assumed 
that a realistic simulation would involve a set of information that could be reasonably 
obtained by the initial investigator; therefore, the scenario only included information the 
investigators discovered at the time they first investigated the suspects in these cases.  
To simulate actual conditions for “new” analysis, the scenario did not identify the 
cases upon which the scenarios were based to the subjects. The cases from which the 
scenarios were derived are listed below, followed by the year which they first 
encountered an investigator. The information found in these scenarios derived solely 
from information available in the public domain, the sources of which are annotated with 
their respective case. 
Scenario 1—Jared Lee Loughner (2009) First contact with police: 200783 
Scenario 2—Omar Gonzalez (2014)  First contact with police: 201484 
Scenario 3—Nidal Hassan (2009)  First contact with police: 200885 
                                                 
83 National Threat Assessment Center, Using a Systems Approach for Threat Assessment 
Investigations: A Case Study on Jared Lee Loughner (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2015).  
84 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident.  
85 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb.  
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Scenario 4—Eric Harris (1999)  First contact with police: 199886 
Scenario 5—Dylan Klebold (1999)  First contact with police: 199887 
1. Survey Part One—Questions 
Subjects answered six questions about each scenario:88 
1. Are you familiar with this case? Although filtered, the scenarios were still 
widely reported when they occurred. If a subject recognized one of these 
cases, they would likely assign a high probability to question 2, thereby 
skewing the results. Asking this question allowed for a second analysis of 
the scores that corrected this bias. 
2. On a scale of 0 to 100, rate how likely it is that this subject will commit 
violence in the future? This is the superforecasting question. 
3. Do you think this subject should be investigated further? This question 
was included to see if there was a divergence of probabilities assigned by 
the subjects from their curiosity in or suspicion of the person described in 
the case. 
4. If you chose to investigate further, what would be your next investigative 
step? This question is an expansion of question 3. 
5. Based on the facts you read, do you think there is cause to arrest this 
subject? This question was intended to detect other potential biases, such 
as sensitivity to risk and the subject’s general sense of the “probable 
cause” standard for arrest. 
6. What were the key aspects of this case that influenced your decision? This 
question permits secondary analysis of which details in each scenario were 
the most salient to the subject. 
2. Survey Part One Data—Scoring the Results 
The experiment borrows from Superforecasting by using the “Brier score” to 
evaluate subjects’ evaluations of the scenarios. The Brier score is a statistic borrowed 
                                                 
86 State of Colorado Department of Law, Office of the Attorney General, Report of the Investigation 
into the 1997 Directed Report and Related Matters Concerning the Columbine High School Shootings in 
April 1999 (Denver, CO: State of Colorado Department of Law, 2004), 
https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/1997_1998_columbine_report.pdf; Columbine Review 
Commission, The Report of Governor Bill Owens Governor’s Columbine Review Commission (Denver, 
CO, Columbine Review Commission, 2001), https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-
%20Governor's%20Commission%20Report.pdf.  
87 Ibid.  
88 The complete survey can be found in Appendix C.  
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from meteorology to evaluate weather forecasters and is designed to reward precision.89 
It does this through an elegant formula, which adds the squared differences between a 
forecast and the actual outcome, and the forecast predicting against the same condition 
and that outcome. For example: 
• If a forecaster predicts a 70 percent chance of rain the next day, and it 
actually rains, then the Brier score is calculated accordingly: 
• The prediction is 70 percent for rain, therefore is it also a prediction of 30 
percent against rain. 
• The outcome was rain (100 percent for / 0 percent against), therefore;  
• (1-0.7)2 + (0-0.3)2 = 0.18 
A lower score represents a more accurate forecast with a minimum of 0 for a 
perfect forecast and a maximum of 2 for a completely inaccurate forecast. The effect of 
squaring the differences is that every change in forecasting precision is rewarded, or 
penalized, exponentially. See Tables 4–9 for scenario Brier score results.  
A general rule of thumb for the results of a Brier score can then be: 
• (perfectly accurate) to <0.5 (slightly more accurate than chance) 
• 0.5 (complete chance—a result from choosing 50 percent, as with a coin 
toss) 
• >0.5 (slightly less accurate than chance) to 2.0 (completely inaccurate).   
                                                 
89 Glen W. Brier, “Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability,” Monthly Weather 




Table 4.   Brier Scores for All Scenarios 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Average for all scenarios 
Overall 0.221 0.241 0.723 0.100 0.409 0.306 
Law 
Enforcement  0.131 0.139 0.855 0.028 0.416 0.244 
Fire Department 
or EMS  0.180 0.320 n/a 0.020 n/a 0.142 
Medicine or 
Public Health  0.5 0.500 0.605 0.125 0.125 0.336 
Other  0.151 0.101 0.720 0.361 0.845 0.378 
 
Table 5.   Scenario 1 Results 
 Are you familiar 





further? Would you arrest? 
 
Overall 
Yes: 0 No: 9 66.7% 
var =1.3% 
Yes: 9 No: 0 
 
Yes: 0 No: 9 
Law Enforcement  Yes: 0 No: 4.69 74.4% Yes: 4.69No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 4.69 
Fire Department or 
EMS  
Yes: 0 No: 0.78 70.0% Yes: 0.78 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.78 
Medicine or Public 
Health  
Yes: 0 No: 1.39 50.0% Yes: 1.39 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 1.39 
Social Worker  Yes: 0 No: 0.07 * Yes: 0.07 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.07 





Table 6.   Scenario 2 Results 
 Are you familiar 





further? Would you arrest? 
 
Overall 
Yes: 0 No: 9 65.3% 
var =1.6% 
Yes: 9 No: 0 Yes: 1 No: 78 
Law Enforcement  Yes: 0 No: 4.69 
73.6% 
Yes: 4.69 No: 0 
 
Yes: 0 No: 4.69 
Fire Department or 
EMS  
Yes: 0 No: 0.78 60% Yes: 0.78 No: 0 Yes: 0.43 No: 0.35 
Medicine or Public 
Health  
Yes: 0 No: 1.39 50% Yes: 1.39 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 1.39 
Social Worker  Yes: 0 No: 0.07 * Yes: 0.07 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.07 
Other  Yes: 0 No: 2.07 77.5% Yes: 2.07 No: 0 Yes: 0.57 No: 1.5 
*No score 
Table 7.   Scenario 3 Results 
 Are you familiar 





further?  Would you arrest?  
 
Overall 
Yes: 7 No: 2 39.9% 
var =0.3% 
Yes: 7 No: 0* Yes: 0* No: 7 
Law Enforcement  Yes: 3.83 No: 0.86 34.6% Yes: 3.64 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 3.64 
Fire Department or 
EMS  
Yes: 0.78 No: 0 No score 
recorded 
Yes: 0.43 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.43 
Medicine or Public 
Health  
Yes: 0.39 No: 1 45% Yes: 1 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 1 
Social Worker  Yes: 0 No: 0.07 ** Yes: 0.07 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.07 
Other  Yes: 2 No: 0.07 40% Yes: 1.86 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 1.86 






Table 8.   Scenario 4 Results 
 Are you familiar 





further?  Would you arrest?  
 
Overall 
Yes: 3 No: 6 77.7% 
var =2.3% 
Yes: 8 No: 1 Yes: 4 No: 5 
Law Enforcement  Yes: 2 No: 2.69 
88.2% 
Yes: 4.64 No: 
0.04 
 
Yes: 1.79 No: 2.9 
Fire Department or 
EMS  
Yes: 0 No: 0.78 
90% 
Yes: 0.43 No: 
0.35 
Yes: 0 No: 0.78 
Medicine or Public 
Health  
Yes: 0 No: 1.39 75% Yes: 1 No: 0.39 Yes: 1 No: 0.39 
Social Worker  Yes: 0 No: 0.07 * Yes: 0.07 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.07 
Other  Yes: 1 No: 1.07 57.5% Yes: 1.86 No: 0.22 
Yes: 1.21 No: 0.86 
*No score 
Table 9.   Scenario 5 Results 
 Are you familiar 





further?  Would you arrest?  
 
Overall 
Yes: 3 No: 6 54.8% 
var =4.0% 
Yes: 6 No: 2* Yes: 1 No: 7* 
Law Enforcement  Yes: 1.04 No: 3.64 54.4% Yes: 3.64 No: 1 Yes: 0 No: 4.64 
Fire Department or 
EMS  
Yes: 0.35 No: 0.43 No score 
recorded 
Yes: 0.43 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.43 
Medicine or Public 
Health  
Yes: 0.39 No: 1 75% Yes: 1 No: 0.3 Yes: 1 No: 0 
Social Worker  Yes: 0 No: 0.07 ** Yes: 0.07 No: 0 Yes: 0 No: 0.07 
Other  Yes: 1.22 No: 0.86 35% Yes: 0.86 No: 1 Yes: 0 No: 1.86 




This experiment only covered a brief time and had a very small sample size. I 
limited the sample size to nine subjects due to restrictions that the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 places on researchers who are federal employees (such as I am).90 Such a 
small sample size may not be representative of an experiment that is more broadly 
represented and longer term. For these reasons, the results of this survey should be 
regarded as an early prototype of an experiment that a law enforcement organization or 
academic institution could perform more extensively. Ideas for how this experiment 
could be expanded and improved are covered in a later section. 
3. Analysis of the Scenario Results 
The Brier scores of the analysts overall was .221 for Scenario 1 (Loughner); .241 
for Scenario 2 (Gonzalez); .100 for Scenario 4 (Harris) and .409 for Scenario 5 (Klebold). 
These results should be regarded as highly predictive for Scenarios 1, 2 and 4, and better 
than chance for Scenario 5. Scenario 3 (Hassan) has a less than predictive score and is 
examined in depth later in this chapter. Although these results derive from too small of a 
sample size to claim that a superforecasting method is an improvement over single 
decision makers or investigative squads, it is promising enough to consider running a 
similar experiment on a larger scale. 
Across all five scenarios, the Brier score was 0.288, derived from an average 
probability score of 62 percent with a small variance of 0.6 percent. The range of scores 
varied widely between 20 percent (a score assigned to Scenario 5 by a respondent who 
indicated recognition of the case) and 99 percent (a score assigned to Scenario 4 by a 
respondent who was also familiar with the case), but when averaged, the scores were 
more moderate but still predictive. This tendency of aggregated scores to generally offset 
the effects of exceptionally high or low individual assessments demonstrates the potential 
for this method. If a larger forum considered similar cases with a similar result, this may 
provide evidence that a broad array of disciplines would offset the extremes, thereby 
providing a more balanced treatment of a case.  
                                                 
90 “Information Collection and Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Overview,” Usability, accessed 
November 5, 2017, https://www.usability.gov/how-to-and-tools/guidance/pra-overview.html.  
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A larger sample size could also be presented with several iterations, wherein 
participants who present more accurate scores can be weighted more than those who are 
inaccurate in later turns. Tetlow used this technique in Superforecasting and produced 
forecasts that were superior to both individual superforecasters (individuals who were 
successful) and professional analysts.  
Responses to other questions in the scenarios may also illuminate the difficulty 
that law enforcement agencies face when making the critical decision to carry a lone 
actor case further. When asked whether a scenario presented enough information to arrest 
the subject, respondents almost unanimously answered “no” across all scenarios; 
however, in four out of five scenarios, a majority of respondents indicated that there was 
enough information to investigate the subject further. This disparity speaks to the 
challenge for law enforcement agencies, which generally measure their success through 
arrest statistics. If a larger experiment registered this divergence in responses, it may 
provide further evidence for the need to develop “softer” solutions, such as countering 
violent extremism initiatives and more collaboration between law enforcement and other 
disciplines, such as public and mental health institutions.  
4. Differences between the Disciplines 
Given the limited number of participants in this experiment, one should not draw 
no definitive conclusions from the results. This level of analysis would be interesting in a 
larger experiment, but with only one or two representatives for all but law enforcement, it 
is impossible to distinguish the effects between the individuals and those of their calling 
in this prototype experiment. 
5. The Fort Hood Exception 
An interesting result emerged in the combined Brier score for Scenario 3, which 
represented the Fort Hood attack. Here, the participants only registered a .608, which 
reflect a result that is slightly worse than an even chance, coin-toss driven decision. There 
are several reasons why this may be the least predictive assessment by the group, but the 
simplest explanation may be the most likely. The information presented in the question 
represented what would have been available to analysts at a moment where a critical 
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decision about the case would have been made, which was not indicative unto itself that 
the subject demonstrated a risk for violence. If this result is consistent in a larger sample 
size, it would indicate that a broader treatment of the case, beyond that of the JTTFs that 
investigated Hassan, may have also found that his behavior, although concerning, was not 
cause to engage in a more intrusive investigation. 
Answers to two other questions associated with the Fort Hood scenario were more 
equivocal. Only half of the respondents indicated that they would investigate further, 
although all indicated that an Army officer’s communication with a “known terrorist 
leader” was concerning. None of the respondents indicated that the facts of the case 
indicated probable cause for arrest; however, this was typical for all scenarios—three 
scenarios (Gonzalez, Harris, and Klebold) had only a single respondent answer “yes” to 
that question., and the other had no respondents answer “yes.”  
The Fort Hood was also the scenario recognizable to the greatest number of 
respondents, which means that those who were familiar and continued to answer 
subsequent questions factored in their preconceptions about the case and underestimated 
the potential for violence; however, the data cannot determine this. The possibility of this 
effect only warrants mentioning here as a possible protocol for future experiments. If 
there were a larger number of participants, scores of those who were familiar could be 
compared to those who were not, and a correlation may emerge between familiarity and 
subsequent scores. Another possibility is that the scores from respondents who are 
familiar with a case can be discarded. 
The data acquired from the case study part of this experiment provides insight 
into how certain narratives were salient for participants, while others were not. The 
reasons for that salience exceed the boundaries of this paper. Some possible lines of 
investigation are offered in Appendix A. One possible answer lies in the risk tolerance of 
the participants when they presented relatively similar choices. This is examined in the 
next phase of the survey. 
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C. SURVEY PART TWO—PROSPECTS AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
SURVEY 
1. Survey Part Two—Prospect Theory Questions 
The design of the second part of the survey was to gain a broader sense of 
subjects’ risk tolerances and decision making based on a prospect theory model. In the 
findings from the original paper on prospect theory by psychologists Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tverskey, subjects demonstrated a preference for certain prospects, which, 
depending on how their choices were presented and risk under uncertainty, contradicted 
prevailing thought on expected utility theory.91 This theory is premised on the 
assumption of the decision maker as a “rational actor,” whereby the preferred choice 
between two prospects was the one that yielded the greatest product between the 
probability of it occurring and its payout. 92 For example, a 50 percent chance to win 
$100 would be preferred to a 100 percent chance to win $45, because the expected value 
of the first choice ($50, or 50% x 100) is greater than $45. Using a series of paired 
prospects, Kahneman and Tverskey found that certain choices were often preferred to 
uncertain ones with a higher expected value.93  
Later research of intelligence professionals presented life-or-death prospects that 
reinforced the findings of prospect theory. This research indicated that intelligence 
professionals who were presented decision-making prospects were more prone to 
“irrational consistencies” than those who were not intelligence professionals. The 
irrational consistencies meant that they made opposite choices on equivalent prospects, 
which were framed as either a gain or a loss.94   
                                                 
91 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263. doi: 
10.2307/1914185.  
92 John van Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947), quoted in Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 270.  
93 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,”  
94 Valerie F. Reyna et al., “Developmental Reversals in Risky Decision Making: Intelligence Agents 
Show Larger Decision Biases Than College Students,” Psychological Science 25, no. 1 (2013): 76, 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613497022.  
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This tendency is what Kahneman and Tversky originally called the “framing 
effect.”95 This effect predicts that people will “overweight. . . sure things and . . 
improbable events, relative to events of moderate probability” and that “[d]ecision 
problems can be described or framed in multiple ways that give rise to different 
preferences.”96 
2. Survey Part Two—Results 
The following six questions are intended to detect risk aversion or risk seeking 
behavior, and the “framing effect,” by presenting the subjects with similar prospects. The 
questions derive form the work of Kahneman and Tverskey, but use a variation of the 
“life or death” context used in Reyna et al.97 See Tables 10–15 for survey questions and 
results.  
Imagine you are managing an investigative squad in a homeland security 
agency, and you need to decide whether to open or close an investigation.  
Table 10.   Prospect 1 Question and Results 
Prospect 1. If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher priority case?  
A. B. 
50% chance to save seven lives 
50% chance that the case is a false 
alarm (nothing happens) 
100% chance to save three lives 
 
 A. B. 
Overall 4.00 5.00 
Law Enforcement  1.64 3.04 
Fire Department or EMS  0.43 0.35 
Medicine or Public Health  1.00 0.39 
Social Worker  0.07 0.00 
Other  0.86 1.22 
                                                 
95 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American Psychologist 39, 
no. 4 (1984): 341–350, doi:10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Reyna et al., “Developmental Reversals.”  
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Table 11.   Prospect 2 Question and Results 
Prospect 2. If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher priority case? 
A. B. 
50% chance to prevent $55 million of 
damage 
50% chance that the case is a false 
alarm (nothing happens) 






Overall 4.00 5.00 
Law Enforcement 1.57 3.11 
Fire Department or EMS 0.43 0.35 
Medicine or Public Health 1.00 0.39 
Social Worker 0.00 0.07 
Other 1.00 1.07 
 
Table 12.   Prospect 3 Question and Results 
Prospect 3. If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher priority case? 
A. B. 
1% chance that 100 people will die 
33% that 9 people will die 
67% that it is a false alarm 






Overall 2.00 6.00* 
Law Enforcement  0.79 2.90 
Fire Department or EMS  0.00 0.78 
Military 0.00 0.00 
Medicine or Public Health  1.00 0.39 
Social Worker  0.00 0.07 
Other  0.21 1.86 
*one respondent did not answer this question 
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Table 13.   Prospect 4 Question and Results 
Prospect 4. If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher-priority case? 
A. B. 
1% chance that $700 million of damage will occur 
33% that $30 million of damage will occur 
67% that it is a false alarm 





Overall 2.00 7.00 
Law Enforcement  0.86 3.83 
Fire Department or EMS  0.00 0.78 
Military 0.00 0.00 
Medicine or Public Health  1.00 0.39 
Social Worker  0.07 0.00 
Other  0.07 2.00 
 
Table 14.   Prospect 5 Question and Results 
Prospect 5. Imagine you are up for promotion. Only 1% of cases you receive have intelligence as solid as 
the case your boss gives you. He assigns it to you and promises that if you succeed, you will receive a 
$10,000 performance bonus. Once you begin investigating, you realize that the intelligence is not as clear 
as you originally thought. Success may hinge on how long you investigate. Which choice below would you 
make? 
Commit to a long investigation. Close the case quickly. 
45% chance that the case is fully successful (full 
$10,000 bonus) 
55% chance that the case is a false alarm 
100% chance that if you cut the case short, you will 





Overall 9.00 0.00 
Law enforcement  4.69 0.00 
Fire department or EMS 0.78 0.00 
Military 0.00 0.00 
Medicine or Public Health  1.39 0.00 
Social Worker  0.07 0.00 
Other  2.07 0.00 
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Table 15.   Prospect 6 Question and Results 
Prospect 6. You receive a promotion from your last case that increases your salary by $10,000 per year. 
Now, as a manager, you have to make the tough choices. Another case arrives on your desk, a “1 %” case, 
with the same issues as the last scenario. Here, you have to make a tough resource allocation decision. 
Commit to a long investigation. Close the case quickly. 
45% chance that the case is fully successful 
55% chance that the case is a false alarm and that your 
agency will be sued for ($10,000 loss) 
100% chance that if you cut the case short, you will only 






Overall 4.00 5.00 
Law enforcement  2.64 2.04 
Fire department or EMS  0.00 0.78 
Military 0.00 0.00 
Medicine or Public Health  1.00 0.39 
Social Worker  0.07 0.00 
Other  0.29 1.79 
 
3. Analysis of the Prospect Theory Responses 
In part two of the survey, respondents evaluated six “prospects” framed in a 
homeland security context. Prospects 1 and 3 and were similar prospects in terms of their 
utility as were Prospects 2 and 4; what distinguished each set was that the utilities were 
described as gains or losses. For example, in Prospects 1 and 2, respondents had to 
choose between two prospects that would “save lives,” signifying a gain; however, in 
Prospects 3 and 4, respondents had similar choices wherein the consequence was “people 
will die,” signifying a loss. Prospects 5 and 6 also contrasted in a similar manner, wherein 
the choices in five signified a gain in the form of a bonus for success, and the choices in 
six were described as a loss in the form of a potential law suit or lost time and resources.  
The responses were strongly consistent with prospect theory in some ways, and 
less so in others. In Prospect 1, five respondents favored the choice of saving three lives 
with 100 percent certainty to a 50 percent prospect of saving seven lives with 50 percent 
certainty (an expected value of 3.5 lives saved). In Prospect 3, a strong majority of seven 
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favored the certain prospect of pursuing the case where “three people will die” with 
certainty over a case where 100 people will die with one percent probability, nine will die 
with 33 percent probability, and 67 percent probability that the case is a false alarm (and 
expected value of four deaths). These responses are consistent, although only mildly so in 
Prospect 1, with the “certainty effect” described by Kahneman and Tversky, whereby 
decision makers favor choices that are certain even when they resolve to a lower expected 
value to alternatives that are uncertain.98  
Prospect theory would also predict that the framing of a perceived gain in one 
prospect, and the loss in another, would produce a favoring of the uncertain choice, or 
risk-seeking behavior, in loss-oriented prospect.99 A cursory review of the data shows 
that this “reflection effect” was absent; however, a review of the manner in which the 
prospects were presented may indicate otherwise. In Kahneman and Tversky’s original 
treatment of the reflection effect, the choices were a pure monetary gain or loss. For 
example, the loss could reflect the cost of a traffic ticket or the decision to buy or not buy 
insurance to recover the replacement cost of property loss.100 In the experiment, the 
“loss” prospect was presented as a choice to prevent a loss, which may have 
unintentionally created a double-negative effect, thereby leading the respondents to 
perceive the choices as gains rather than losses. 
Responses to Prospects 2 and 4 were similar to 1 and 3, wherein respondents 
favored certain choices over uncertain ones yeilding a larger expected value. The choices 
were also intended to be reflective, with one framed as a “prevented” economic damage 
and the other as “damage will occur;” however, this distinction may have also been 
ambiguous to the respondents. Like Prospects 1 and 2, the respondents selected the 
certain choices of preventing a smaller amount of expected economic damage over the 
uncertain, but larger, potential damage. 
                                                 
98 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 265–267.  
99 Ibid., 268.  
100 Ibid., 268–271.  
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In the final two prospects, the results were more clearly counter to prospect 
theory. In Prospect 5, all respondents favored the choice that was not only uncertain but 
also one with a smaller expected value: 45 percent probability of a $10,000 bonus versus 
a guaranteed bonus of $5,000. In Prospect 6, more respondents (five to three) favored the 
choice with a more favorable expected value of $5,000 over a “gamble” with a 55 percent 
chance of losing $10,000 but a 45 percent chance of losing nothing; however, this is also 
a potential contradiction to what prospect theory predicts. In facing losses, prospect 
theory predicts that respondents may become risk seeking, rather than favoring the 
certain gains demonstrated in the responses to Prospects 1 through 4.101 The 
eccentricities of these responses may be a consequence of the way the choices were 
described in the survey questions, or they could reflect idiosyncratic risk tolerances of the 
respondents. Another explanation may be found in Kahneman’s later description of loss 
aversion and prospect theory, which notes that the scale of different choices may affect a 
decision maker’s choices.102  
In spite of some possible inconsistencies, in very particular ways, with prospect 
theory, a pattern from the responses emerges generally favoring certain prospects to 
uncertain ones, despite the greater expected values of alternative choices. This may help 
to explain the relative strength of some probability scores in the case oriented scenarios 
than others. The highest predictions for scores were found in Scenarios 4, 1, and 2, which 
were the Harris, Loughner, and Gonzalez cases, respectively. There may be 
characteristics of that narrative, such as previous encounters with law enforcement, 
possession of weapons, or other characteristics, which make these choices more tangible, 
or by extension, certain, than the other two scenarios. Given the limited number of 
questions in this experiment, and the limited sample size, this can only be left to 
speculation here; however, it presents a possibility for further research where case studies 
can be presented alongside prospect theory questions to determine the effects of risk 
tolerance on case study related decisions. 
                                                 
101 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 271.  
102 Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 283–285.  
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The limited size of the survey precludes any larger assumptions about 
investigative decision making, and the results indicate an accuracy that is compelling in 
some cases, but it also generates further questions about why some cases were more 
compelling than others to the survey participants. These are questions that can only be 
examined through a larger survey, one which explores these decisions in depth. The 
combination of the scenario based and prospect theory questions would enable a 
simultaneous examination of risk detection in the cases, which would be correlated to the 
decision making that participants make under uncertainty in more hypothetical choices. 
The possibility of a deployment of a superforecasting system into actual 
enforcement decisions also warrants examination. The advantages and pitfalls of such a 
deployment are examined in the next chapter, while several ideas for further research and 





V. IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUPERFORECASTING 
NETWORK FOR DETECTING LONE ACTOR VIOLENCE: 
THE SUPERNETWORK  
It is worth revisiting the current framework of multidisciplinary collaboration in 
investigations, the task force model, in order to contrast it to a new model that uses a 
networked Superforecasting technique, which would be called a supernetwork. Task 
forces are generally a collocation of various practitioners who are organized under a 
unifying purpose, the “task,” and a harmonizing organizational structure, the “force.” 
This organizational model was a solution to a particular problem, where the disparate 
efforts of several government agencies were at best less than the sum of their parts, and at 
worst, worked at cross-purposes. But over time, task forces assume an organizational 
identity of their own, and it appears that as this identity grows, the benefits from 
interdisciplinary participation decreases. 
A supernetwork could avoid this problem by using a flat, networked 
organizational model, wherein participants remain in their professions day-to-day, but 
dedicate a small percentage of their time to the analysis of potential threats. Such a view 
from afar would insulate them from decision-making biases that may result from being in 
a single organization while working toward a common purpose. 
A. WISDOM OF THE CROWD VERSUS EXPERTISE 
While the use of a supernetwork may improve threat analysis, it is likely a 
mistake to envision such a construct as a replacement for the in-depth examination that a 
traditional law enforcement investigation would provide. The advent of networked 
information and the rising availability of information has spawned the misconception that 
expertise does not matter. In a moment when populism and homegrown narrative and 
reporting have taken on significant strength, expertise suffered further damage. Tetlow 
dreads the prefix of “so-called” so often used by populists when describing experts.103 
This is confirmation bias turned on its head and taken to an extreme when pundits 
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disparage expertise when the evidence is aligned against their narrative. They tear down 
the messenger and present “alternative facts.” 
On the other hand, the lesson of superforecasting seems to auger against pure 
reliance on expertise. It is a story of amateurs beating the professionals in prediction, 
even when the professionals had exclusive access to classified information. Groupthink 
speaks to the hazards of overreliance on expertise, particularly when it is a team of 
experts who amplify each other’s biases. The result of this prototype experiment may 
support this assertion. The decision between expertise and the wisdom of the crowd may 
be a false choice. A mixed methodology can tether the depth of knowledge and 
commitment to craft that an expert has with the distributed strength found in a network.  
A mixed approach may have advantages that extend beyond the aggregation of 
experts who are arrayed against a problem. The “citizen scientist” model, which has been 
effectively used in scientific endeavors such as astronomy and meteorology, provides 
examples of how a distributed network of detection can be aligned with deep expertise. In 
applying such a model to threat analysis, an organizational topology that is flat and wide 
may offset groupthink and increase the collective’s sensitivity to emerging trends. Having 
it populated with experts will ensure that legal and ethical standards are held and that the 
public’s rights are safeguarded. 
B. ENGAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY LEADERS 
In the specific case of religion-inspired lone wolf terrorism, a solution posited by 
some countering violent extremism strategies is to recruit faith leaders, such as imams for 
Islamic extremism, to identify radicalizing individuals or to have teachers and other 
educators report disturbing behavior. Yet, if there is a bond between social leaders and 
other group members operating at several levels, such as faith, culture, family and 
ethnicity, such an expectation that may be morally repugnant to those faith leaders. 
Compelling community leaders to engage directly in the detection of potentially violent 
behavior may be akin to expecting a mother to betray her child. A broad based analytical 
network may counterbalance that sense of betrayal. In this sense, proximity may be 
inversely related to objectivity.  
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C. POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF THE SUPERNETWORK 
The analytical system, tested in the experiment and contemplated as an 
organizational model in this chapter, imagines an integrated and efficient network 
employing the talents of many disciplines to address a particular problem. Here, the 
question switches from “will it work” to “does it work too well?”  
A secondary phase of the supernetwork could be to conduct background analysis 
of feedback from the analysts, including sentiment analysis of text, correlation with large 
data sets, and the use of social media tools to encourage dialog between government and 
the public. It is possible that an overreliance of any or all of these methods, including the 
network itself, could present unintended consequences.  
D. CIVIL RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS 
An accepted supernetwork that works well could be misapplied or misinterpreted 
by an organization placing excessive faith in its predictive capabilities. Tools that rely on 
quantitative analysis have an inherent opacity. When this data is extruded through the 
analytical “black box,” only a rarified few understand exactly what the box is doing. It is 
difficult for the analyst, the investigator, the prosecutor, the judge, or ultimately, the 
public to understand how that black box has developed its output. Analysts and 
investigators cannot entertain their skepticism with direct scrutiny of the methodology 
behind the analysis. Instead, they must fall back on conventional wisdom and first-hand 
experience. In doing so, another layer of uncertainty arises, since it may be their 
observations, through confirmation bias or other behavioral influences, that are flawed—
not the predictive system itself. 
Data mining tools are growing in capacity while the public leaves a rising volume 
of digital data “exhaust.” Citizens knowingly and unknowingly leave a stream of 
heretofore private information that can be exploited by third parties. To date, case law is 
lagging behind. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches by law 
enforcement, and case law and legislation have followed to refine those restrictions; 
however, they are based on the sensibilities of a decidedly analog society that existed 
over 35 years ago.  
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These laws and cases considered how modern government collection techniques 
and other authorities related to the Constitution. The principles of those standards endure, 
but the specific restrictions that they impose on the government struggle for relevance 
against contemporary collection and analytical capabilities.  
• Katz v. U.S. (1967), Smith v. Maryland (1979), and Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (1968) form the bedrock of 
these standards for law enforcement, which obligate the probable cause 
standard for electronic intercepts, define reasonable expectation of 
privacy, mandate “minimization” procedures that restrict government 
collection and retention of intercepted communications.  
• Terry v. Ohio (1968) determined, “The Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ‘protects people, not places,’ and therefore 
applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or 
elsewhere.”104 
• The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and Executive Order 
12333 (1981) distinguished law enforcement from the intelligence 
community, set unique restrictions upon intelligence operations, obligated 
intelligence use the “least intrusive means” for collecting intelligence, and 
defined when the broader collection authorities over “agents of a foreign 
power” applied.105 
Smith determined that telephone number recording “pen registers” (i.e., metadata 
collection devices circa 1979) were reasonable because similar collection was part of the 
course of doing business at a telephone company. In the words of Justice Blackmun,  
When petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the phone 
company and “exposed” that information to its equipment in the normal 
course of business, he assumed the risk that the company would reveal the 
information to the police.106 
The contemporary meaning of “assumed risk” has been obscured as customers 
forfeit a much greater volume of data to a company than they did in 1979. The courts and 
Congress have not determined how accessible data should be for the government when it 
is originally acquired by a corporation or unknowingly forfeited by its citizens. 
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Regarding Terry, which defined boundaries for physical searches and seizures, 
these principles have not been defined for the digital era. The protections against 
reasonable searches and seizures apply to an individual “at home or elsewhere,” but there 
is no clear stipulation about whether “elsewhere” includes data in a digital device, or on 
“the cloud.” 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Executive Order 12333 define an 
“agent of a foreign power,” which enables more invasive collection against such powers. 
Conventional wisdom conflates terrorists with agents of a foreign power, as does the 
2004 lone wolf amendment to FISA. Yet terrorism is an elusive definition, which is often 
defined outside of the courts.  
The operative standard is a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” wherein privacy 
is the primary concern. What this standard does not consider is what is “reasonable” in an 
era where data collection and analysis capabilities are far greater than they were at the 
time these rules were written? Is the reasonable standard changed with the force 
multiplier effects of cameras, data processing, and analytics that put a “virtual” cop at 
every corner? At what point is the greatly enhanced technological capability of 
government an encroachment on the Fourth Amendment? It is not difficult to imagine a 
moment when technical capacity for predictive and data mining tools will outpace case 
law and public sensibilities of what data is in bounds for analysis and what is not.  
E. HYPER-VIGILANCE, CONFIRMATION BIAS, AND THE CONTAGION 
OF PREJUDICE 
With the onset of a broadly networked system to analyze threats, there is a risk 
that the constant pulse of threat-related information to laypersons outside of the security-
related professions will cause them to become inordinately security conscious. An 
extreme but ominous extension of this trend would be the emergence of a security state 
that is reinforced by a steady dose of threat related information. 
In their research on risk, Kahnneman and Tversky note that humans have a 
tendency to detect false patterns in randomness and randomness in patterns.107 It is 
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possible that analysts who view a steady stream of threat synopses could also perceive 
false patterns. Those biases could emerge spontaneously, or could reinforce existing 
biases, what the researchers call confirmation bias.  
Examination of “fake news” and investigation of the potential exploitation of 
latent biases in American society by a foreign power provide a tangible example of how 
this trend can occur. It also exemplifies how information, good and bad alike, can 
propagate through an effective network. Just as ignition requires heat, fuel, and oxygen, 
the emergence of a broad social shift requires a compelling narrative, the means to 
transmit it, and a willing society—removal of one component will stop the reaction. 
F. CONSIDERING THE NET EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT 
It is difficult to forecast whether deployment of a supernetwork would be a net 
benefit or loss to the greater public. Contemplating this question is reminiscent of other 
nascent technologies, which solve a particular problem but yield unintended 
consequences. The potential risks of a supernetwork do not necessarily preclude it 
deployment; however, they should be recognized and considered honestly. A 
supernetwork, no matter its predictive accuracy, is still a forecast, with a same potential 
for false positives and false negatives that any forecast carries. It is a timeworn 
expression in forecasting that correlation should not be confused with causation. This is 
analogous to the relationship young investigators learn between circumstantial evidence 
and guilt: one may be indicative of the other but not necessarily. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Considering the limited number of participants in the superforecasting survey, it 
can only be speculated here why the threat analysis of this group was superior to actual 
investigators. The most apparent explanation is that the wide range of backgrounds lends 
itself to more thorough analysis. This may be true, but there are already multiagency or 
multidisciplinary teams, such as task forces, that should yield a similar result if that was 
the strongest factor. It may be that the subjects, unlike members of a task force, are 
unburdened from the conventions and constraints of being in an organization. 
Unburdened by groupthink, the analysts are free to provide better analysis. 
Superforecasting analogizes biased decision making by referring to the “green 
tinted glasses” in The Wizard of Oz, wherein all citizens wore tinted glasses within the 
Emerald City to accentuate its “greenness” but at the expense of seeing anything else.108 
It is possible that investigators wear green eyeshades. With a more particular expertise 
and mission, an investigator might only see the “green” of a threat, while missing other 
warning signals. Conversely, an investigator’s glasses might be “red”—the opposite of 
green—wherein a steady dose of false alarms leads the investigator to assume that all 
threats are negative. In this case, the subtle shading of the threat grows invisible, and the 
investigator recognizes only the extremely prominent details. The results of the Monte 
Carlo experiment demonstrate that neither scenario—the green being the investigate 
everything model and the red being the rapidly diminishing—produces efficient results. 
Considering the result of the Monte Carlo models and prototype superforecasting 
experiment together encourages further examination into the art and science of 
investigative decision making and analysis. The scope of both was limited and neither 
can be judged as conclusive; however, the results of both are counterintuitive. The Monte 
Carlo models demonstrate how different decision-making models may yield marginal 
improvements in detection, but when applied to a “low-probability / high consequence” 
phenomenon like lone actor attacks, will do so with rapidly increasing exposure to false 
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positive decisions. The superforecasting experiment indicates that a diverse forum of 
analysts may be better capable of detecting the signals of emerging violence than a single 
decision maker or investigative agency. 
It is possible that implementing a superforecasting network may enable an 
investigative organization to calibrate its decision making while reducing the exposure to 
false positive risk indicated in the Monte Carlo models. Aside from the improved 
accuracy of detection, an analytical forum that is representative of the community that is 
being policed may diffuse the consequences of false positives, as analysts could factor 
their constituent concerns, cultural sensitivities, and civil liberties into their analysis.  
At the same time, a networked forum may be vulnerable to the contagion of 
certain biases, which would amplify poor decision-making. The following section will 
contemplate how an analytical network could be implemented, how and why it may 
improve lone actor investigations, and the potential risks from its implementation. 
In the final weeks while this thesis was written, three additional lone actor attacks 
occurred in the United States. The earliest, the mass shooting in Las Vegas in October 
2017, was included in the Monte Carlo modeling but not in the survey. The other two, a 
vehicle attack in New York City (late October 2017), and a mass shooting in San Antonio 
(early November 2017), occurred too late for inclusion in the research. 
The Las Vegas attack is an apt example of the randomness of lone actor attacks 
and stands in contrast to the Fort Hood attack, which was the topic of this paper’s 
introduction. The investigation of the Las Vegas attacker is ongoing, and our 
understanding of what motivated the attack remains uncertain. Unlike with the attacker at 
Fort Hood, the behavioral indicators that the Las Vegas attacker exhibited were available 
to few, did not appear to be available to law enforcement for consideration, and only 
seem indicative of violence in hindsight.  
It is in witnessing tragedies like Las Vegas and the experience of this research, I 
am more circumspect about what I characterized as “missed opportunities” of law 
enforcement agencies when the research of this thesis began. In the face of randomness 
and the realization that even the most effective method of analysis could not detect the 
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Las Vegas attack, I return to a favored axiom of my father, an earlier practitioner in my 
field, who used to say “there is no such thing as perfect security.”  
However, I do remain hopeful for a modicum of improvement. Lone actor attacks 
appear infrequent when compared to other crimes and tragic events, yet seem all too 
frequent as they are witnessed nearly two out of every three months over the past several 
years. As caretakers of the public security, practitioners should strive to find better ways 
to detect these events and reduce their frequency. At the same time, as sworn defenders 
of the Constitution, practitioners should achieve those gains without the expense of 
undermining the tenets the Constitution delineates. Involvement of a broad forum of 
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APPENDIX A.  IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
In conducting the research and writing for this thesis, I found that in spite of my 
status as a practitioner in threat analysis, I had a lot to learn about the science of decision 
making generally, and more specifically, how it is applied to threat investigations. This 
led to a very meandering path toward conclusion of this effort, which I hope is not too 
apparent in the body of this paper but will likely be obvious in the ensuing paragraphs. 
Over the course of this process I did a lot of free associative writing over the summer in 
anticipation of writing the thesis. Some of it was more germane and found its way into 
the main chapters, some was not, and some sort of fell in the middle. With apologies for 
the free form nature of the way these sections are presented, here is what may be called 
the “director’s cut” of ideas and unresolved questions that were always in the 
background, but I regulated here for me to remember and return to later. 
The Superposition of Threats—Schrödinger’s Lone Wolf 
In the early twentieth century, physicist Erwin Schrödinger used a thought 
experiment to demonstrate how the behavior of subatomic particles could be true in one 
hand, and untrue more generally—particularly toward larger physical phenomena. This 
paradox is that a quantum particle could occupy two states simultaneously; this was later 
affirmed through the theory’s underlying math and several experiments, yet such a 
physical superposition would be considered bizarre to the naked eye.109 For instance, I 
cannot be in Rome and Monterey at the same time. 
Schrödinger’s experiment described a hypothetical scenario in which a cat was 
inside a box, and within the box was a device that may or may not kill the cat. The device 
had a trigger that was purely automatic and random, meaning that an observer outside the 
box may know the probability of whether the trigger had actually engaged and eventually 
killed the cat but could not know with certainty whether the cat was dead unless the box 
109 Ismael Jenann, “Quantum Mechanics,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2015 ed., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/qm/.  
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was opened. Absent the observation, which imposes one essence or the other on the cat, 
the cat is both alive and dead simultaneously.110  
Such a dual state as alive and dead may be an affront to common sense, but 
quantum physics accepts such a dual state as true. Investigators must apply the same 
logic to threat investigations. A subject for investigation may be a physical threat, or not. 
The essence of the threat cannot be defined until one of two things have happened—
either the subject attacks, or enough time has elapsed whereby the subject does not attack, 
and a reasonable observer can consider the subject to be safe.  
Extending this analogy one step further demonstrates the confounding nature of 
threat investigations. Once the attack has occurred, but no earlier, the subject is definitely 
a threat; however, the subject who does not attack always carries a potential to do so at 
some point in the future. The superposition in the latter case is perpetual. It is also 
difficult to determine whether the benign state of a subject is the result of his or her never 
carrying the intention to attack, or a result of the imposition of the investigator into his or 
her life. This is a measurement effect that should be contemplated in future research on 
threat assessment, and particularly if the superforecasting experiment is expanded. The 
Brier score relies on a binary “it happened/it did not happen” outcome; however, there is 
never a pure “did not happen” scenario with threats. 
Gamifying Analysis to Maintain Supernetwork Participation 
An explanation for why the subjects in the experiment of this research produced 
superior analysis may be found in the way I presented the questions to them as a game-
like exercise. Superforecasting describes how a broad, networked assembly of analysts 
triumphs over professionals. Underlying this story is an examination of the ways 
cognitive biases can lead an individual or group from good decisions. However, 
underlying the whole Tetlock’s experiment was a tournament, a game.  
Gamifying is the use of game-like elements for endeavors that typically are not 
competitive.111 Gamified systems are used by social media sites, marketers, and 
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elsewhere, as an effective means to captivate and hold participants. It may be that a 
gamified approach to threat analysis may encourage more sustained attention, better 
collaboration, and more diverse participation. 
Feeding the Network 
What phenomena spur growth and divergence in an analytical network? What 
causes pruning of the ineffective parts of the network? Does this mimic neural expansion 
and pruning? 
Other Questions about Networks 
How would a distributed model affect espirit de corps? How would it affect 
collaboration? Would there be an ingroup-outgroup dynamic? 
What about cultural differences? Would a distributed approach be better 
positioned to detect trends in a diverse environment?  
Concerning the previous question, what about international systems? It seems that 
Interpol and Europol are less centralized. Both are a clearinghouse for information. This 
might be a step toward integration, but it might also be the best example of a networked 
approach that is available. What are the legal strictures for Europeans? Is their access 
greater than, or less than, that of the United States? Does this and their diversity dictate a 
networked approach? What about media richness? Does the remote perspective of 
networked analysts improve or diminish their comprehension of a threat? 
Marketing, Epidemiology, and Countering Violent Extremism 
Marketing guru Seth Godin describes otaku, which is the obsessive devotion to a 
particular thing. He describes how important it is to engage otaku as a marketing strategy. 
If otaku is properly stimulated, then that idea will go viral.112  
                                                                                                                                                 
111 Steffen P. Walz and Sebastian Deterdin “An Introduction to the Gameful World,” in The Gameful 
World: Approaches, Issues, Applications, ed. Steffen P. Walz and Sebastian Deterdin (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2014), 1–2.  
112 Seth Godin, “How to Get Your Ideas to Spread,” TED, February 2003, 
https://www.ted.com/talks/seth_godin_on_sliced_bread#t-676376.  
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Taking the idea of “going viral” literally, epidemiologists identify certain 
members of a population as critical when trying to interdict the spread of a virus. When 
inoculating an entire population is impossible, it is almost as effective to identify these 
prominent members who, if they are infected with a disease, will spread it wider and 
more rapidly than others. 
Some social scientists have observed that violence propagates through a social 
network the way a popular marketing trend or an infectious disease does.113 Similarly, 
corrosive social ideas can spread as efficiently through a network as any other trend. 
What can we learn from these ideas? What would marketers or epidemiologists 
say about the several approaches to countering violent extremism that target at the fringes 
of a social network? These strategies in marketing or epidemiology appear to be doomed 
to failure. Are the various countering violent extremism strategies that the U.S. 
government employs doomed to the same fate? 
It may be that our counter narratives, our interventions, and our broader strategy 
for counterterrorism needs to focus on the otaku in the culture from which the threat 
emerges. If terrorists are essentially lethal “fan-boys” then maybe something that is more 
compelling will reintegrate them into their host society. This does not imply that an 
individual who appears resolved to attack should be ignored; this would be as foolish as 
leaving someone who has caught a disease to die if they are not one of the critical nodes 
in their social network. However, remaining in a constant hunt for individual threats is 
equally foolish and will certainly strain limited resources. 
Observing from an organizational perspective, strategies to fight an epidemic that 
do not integrate several different disciplines tend to fail. Epidemics tend to emerge from a 
miasma of poverty, a diminished public health infrastructure, and cultural practices that 
enable the spread of the pathogen. A singular focus on the etiology of the disease, or the 
society from which the disease emerges, only addresses part of the problem. The same 
                                                 
113 Andrew V. Papachristos et al., “The Company You Keep? The Spillover Effects of Gang 
Membership on Individual Gunshot Victimization in a Co-offending Network,” Criminology 53, no. 4 
(2015): 624–649, doi: 10.1111/1745-9125.12091.  
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goes for a strategy of quarantine, which in a networked world will only contain a problem 
for so long. 
If it has not occurred yet, maybe the counterterrorism (or counterviolence) 
apparatus would benefit from studying what has worked with epidemiology. What has 
worked to arrest the emergence of an epidemic may also work with the growth of a 
violent ideology. In turn, what has failed in one field may portend a failure of a similar 
strategy in the other.  
Maybe we are approaching the whole thing too literally. Maybe we are too 
focused on the pathology that drives the killer, the ideology that inspires him, or the 
global-scaled forces that propel those ideas. The fact that the idea is articulated or 
justified on global terms does not mean that the attacker operates with a global agenda. 
On the opposite end, the anxieties extant in the attacker may not be the sole precursor to 
violence.  
Google Trends and Sentiment Analysis 
Seth Stephens-Davidovitz published research that correlates Google search data to 
social events.114 This strikes me as a crude form of sentiment analysis. Maybe there is a 
correlation that can be found within Google data that will targeted violence. 
Why:  
• Stephens-Davidovitz’s research seems to argue that this is a reflection of 
our true selves—more than surveys or personal interviews.115 If Google 
searches are the window into our souls, then maybe this dark corner of 
them can be revealed. 
• This is true meta-analysis. It may be enough to scrape the top layer of 
social media data to get results that are predictive enough.  
• OR—It may contextualize personal interviews that occur with suspects. 
• It may portend seismic shifts that could trigger violence.  
                                                 
114 Seth Stephens-Davidovitz, Everybody Lies: Big Data, New Data, and What the Internet Can Tell 
Us about Who We Really Are (New York: HarperCollins, 2017), 9.  
115 Ibid., 106.  
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• But—does this agree with NTAC research? It indicates that a 
personal event portends violence, more so than outside influence. 
• If ISIS is finding and manipulating potential violent actors, then why are the 
police so unsuccessful? 
Why not: 
• This is sentiment analysis but done crudely.  
• Sentiment analysis requires foreknowledge of the sentiment, and how it is 
reflected in words. Some attackers use language that is incoherent to an 
outside listener, but has deep meaning to the assailant. For example: 
Loughner repeatedly spoke of the meaning of math.  
• First Amendment protections. 
Google Trends Analysis of lone actor phenomena—correlate lone actor search 
activity with wider search activity to see if behavior is “triggered’ by particular events. 
Salience in investigations—What makes a case more prominent? Why is terrorism 
salient to the members of public? Why is their risk perception so distorted? 
Terrorism captivates a population. Positioning it in the family of “asymmetric 
warfare” alludes to the out scale effect of terrorist violence. For example—in the summer 
of 2017 a car careened into Times Square and killed three people but was later 
determined to be an accident. Two weeks later, a van deliberately ran into six pedestrians 
on London Bridge, killing six. Both are tragic, but only one was characterized as 
terrorism—London. Once the New York attack was defined as a tragic accident, the 
world moved on, but the public’s attention to London endured for several days. 
There are many theories of why we react to terrorism in such a strong way, in 
spite of the low probability that we will be victims of it. For one, people are poor judges 
of risk; what they fear the most does not always accord with the probability. Beyond 
terrorism, people perceive shark attacks as a greater risk than drowning; violent crime 
more than vehicle accidents; or continuing with vehicles, dwell on the few incidents in 
which self-driven vehicles fail while on the day those incidents happen, an average of 
100 people die across the nation from human error behind the wheel without mention. 
Also, is there a “multiplier” for this effect? Can I quantify two similar incidents—
one an act of terrorism and the other not—and determine how much terrorism amplifies 
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coverage by the media, or perceived fear in the public? Would a treatment of Google 
search activity for two such events and news coverage get us to this multiplier?  
Can this technique also measure resilience? For example, the October 31, 2017 
vehicle attack in New York City received intensive coverage; it was the largest terrorist 
attack in New York since the September 11, 2017 attacks. It was also committed in the 
shadow of the new World Trade Center. Yet the mayor of New York City emphasized the 
resilience of New Yorkers, who moved on to their Halloween activities that night. Just as 
the construction of the new World Trade Center is a metaphorical example of resilience, 
the return to normalcy on Halloween night may be a literal an immediate example of the 
same. 
Google trends may illuminate this. In its “Google Insights” page for June 6, 2017, 
Google tallied the relative search interest for the London Bridge terrorism attacks that 
occurred on June 3. The search interest for this topic lasted 31 hours, peaking on the hour 
of the attack and diminishing to 10 percent over a day later. This incident accumulated 
over 28,464 news articles. For the Orlando shooting, the Google interest in the story 
diminished by 90 percent about 14 hours after the attack. 
“A-B” Testing Potential and the Study of Salience in Violent Events 
A-B testing is a common practice in online marketing, wherein advertising 
messages presented to different consumers is altered slightly and their reaction is 
quantified. Such a technique could be used to study what aspects of threat-related 
information are most salient to investigators, or supernetworked analysts.  
Tribalism and the Analysis of Threats and Pre-conceptions 
Robert Sapolsky wrote that the human brain makes constant microbiological 
adjustments at any minute, which can trigger different biases.116 In his book Behave, 
Sapolsky takes a biological explanation for phenomena as wide ranging as sociology, 
social psychology, political science, and other aspects of human behavior. If there are 
                                                 
116 Robert M Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of Humans at our Best and Worst (New York: Penguin, 
2017).  
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physiological predispositions to cooperation, are there ways we can stimulate them to get 
an intended result? Are the methods we are using offensive to these hardwired triggers? 
As for multinational organizations, such as Europol, how can social and national 
divides be differentiated from organizational effects? 
Specialization 
The use of a broad multidisciplinary network for analysis requires participants to 
act as generalists while they analyze threats. In Behave, Sapolosky describes organic 
specialization: Specialized, different organisms have different relative strengths and 
weaknesses that are the product of evolution.117 Do members of complex organizations 
naturally specialize in the same way? On the other hand—stem cells carry the potential to 
become any specialized cell. Are we more like stem cells, or specialized cells? 
Digital Jurisprudence—Civil Rights in the Digital Age 
This is not a new idea, but one that returned throughout the writing of this thesis, 
and the duration of this master’s program. Just as we appear to be emerging into what is 
sometimes called a new Industrial Revolution, where the assumptions that guided 
efficient corporate organization, labor and management relations, trade, and other 
economic theories; an analogous transformation of our social interactions may be afoot.  
We need to consider the implications of these changes on civil rights and freedom 
generally. Any innovations that are deployed by government that may infringe on those 
rights should be included in this discussion, including the implementation of an analytical 
network like the one considered in this thesis. 
Industrial Organization 
The economics of imperfect competition defines why, in some markets, 
organizations compete while others will behave in oligopolistic ways. In this form of 
cooperation, firms will agree to forgo competition out of self-interest and to retain market 
dominance. 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 7–9.  
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Are investigative agencies monopolistic or oligopolistic? Why do agencies 
cooperate at times and not in others? Can this be explained through an industrial 
organization framework? If so, then what is the benefit for which they are competing? Is 
it a broader social good? If so, then why not cooperate? If it is something more banal 
(like prestige) then is the propensity to cooperate more situational? Are task forces like 
joint ventures? Do they follow the rules of cartels?  
Auftragstaktik and Government Decision Making 
James Q Wilson’s Bureaucracy, describes Auftragstaktik, which is the German 
military philosophy that emphasizes tactical initiative at the lowest possible rank.118 It 
contrasts the philosophy of many other armies, including the U.S. Army, on command-
and-control, which requires a constant reach back to high commanders who were several 
ranks above and many miles away from the actual fighting. American tactical leaders are 
given detailed instructions on how an objective should be achieved. In contrast, 
Auftragstaktik gives tactical leaders the objective but leaves the details of how to achieve 
it to those leaders. 
How does this translate to threat analysis? Are there examples of either in the 
investigation of threats? Traditionally, sole investigators and remote field investigative 
units like task forces have the initiative to follow leads in a way they see fit. On another, 
the failure to detect some threats has led to a call by critics to centralize and harmonize 
command and control of broadly-distributed investigative units.  
Does this demonstrate the divide between tactics and strategy? Maybe 
institutional imperatives, such as arrests and other success stories, flow through to the 
tactical level, thereby leaving investigators compelled to seek visible signs of success. It 
is difficult to measure success without these dramatic conclusions, and the failures are 
extremely prominent. 
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Analysis of Threats and Pre-conceptions 
Consider the emergence of a threat presented by an individual as the intersection 
between a person’s solitary motivations, the norms of society. If context colors behavior, 
that context is shaped by culture, which is as broad as national and religious identity, and 
as discrete as mother to child. A remote analysis of that individual’s behavior can be 
blind to the contours of cultural influences. How broad and varied does analysis have to 
be to gain awareness of context? 
Prospect Theory and Terrorist Recruitment 
Is recruitment of a single actor a prospect theory problem? The risk versus 
rewards of recruitment are very different for vetting a terrorist aspirant than it is for 
investigating one. Said differently, ISIS can reject an applicant who means it no harm, 
and it is only an opportunity cost. When the police identify a suspect as a threat when she 
or he is not, the costs are great (measured in wasted resources, in liability, and in 
deleterious effects in the community). A second cost is when a threat is erroneously 
identified as benign; however, the rarity of these events makes it a “safer bet.” 
The Pitfalls of Predictive Analytics and Reasonable Expectations 
Using predictive tools can be a dangerous exercise when placed in the hands of 
those who are not aware of the limitations of the practice. While the expectation is a 
perfect forecast, being able to gauge broader trends that are more productive than the 
mean is sufficient.  
Isn’t this what we are trying to achieve with good policy? Are we simply trying to 
reach a decision that is within one or two standard deviation’s accurate rather than 
pinpoint accuracy? Are we simply trying to beat the coin toss decision? How does this 
translate to threat assessment, where we are looking at individuals in a very precise 
scenario?  
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APPENDIX B.  MODEL SELECTION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
FOR THE TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND MONTE CARLO 
MODELS 
In Chapter III of this thesis, I described how I collected data on lone actor 
violence in the United States between 1982 and 2017. In that chapter, I also explain three 
methods I used to analyze that data. These methods were time series autocorrelation 
analysis, a “runs test,” and a Monte Carlo model. This appendix elaborates on why I used 
these three techniques, and more specifically, why I made decisions in each of the models 
to analyze the data, represent the data, or both. 
Statistical model building masquerades as a purely objective undertaking; 
however, it is as much art as science. The art is in found in data selection, and in 
choosing how to analyze the data one it is selected. Like bakers and carpenters, 
quantitative analysts are reminded of the hazards of overworking their material. In 
statistics, this is usually summarized by quoting “Occam’s razor,” which emphasizes that 
“descriptions be kept as simple as possible until proved inadequate.”119 For this reason, I 
left the data, which appears at the end of this appendix, as untouched as possible. In 
analyzing that data, I used basic tests for pattern detection assuming that if a pattern 
emerged, then that may justify rejection of the hypothesis that lone actor violence, over 
time, was random. 
Time Series Analysis 
I first determined whether there was a pattern to be discovered in these attacks, 
based on earlier, or “lagged,” data points.120 This is based on the assumption that 
detection of a more complex pattern from other variables was unlikely, given the 
multiplicity of motives and affiliations (if any) of attackers. Also, lone actor attacks are 
sudden and unexpected; therefore, I assumed that any detection of these attacks was 
                                                 
119 Maurice G. Kendall and William R. Buckland, A Dictionary of Statistical Terms, quoted in 
Damodar Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 353–354.   
120 Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, 505–512.  
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lagged, rather than “real-time.” Arguably, any explanatory data that is not lagged in this 
context is too late, since the attack has occurred. 
Autocorrelation is defined as the “correlation between members of series of 
observations ordered in time or space.”121 This statistic was used to make an initial 
assessment of any pattern within the time series data used for this thesis. If a pattern 
between an attack and lagged attacks existed, there would be a statistically significant 
autocorrelation between the time that attack occurred, and a point in time before it 
occurred. For this series, days when attacks occurred were given a value of one, and days 
without an attack were given a value of zero; therefore, if an attack, or non-attack, at time 
t depended repeatedly on the occurrence of the same outcome at time t-x (where x equals 
the length of the lag), then the autocorrelation would be 1. If there was an opposite 
relationship (i.e., an attack at time t depended on a non-attack at time t-x) then the 
outcome would be -1. If there is no relationship, the statistic is close to zero. 
To determine the autocorrelations, I analyzed the series of attacks using a time 
series for every day between January 1, 1982 and October 1, 2017 with the JMP Pro 
12.2.0 statistical program. Using the one for dates with attack, zero for dates with attack 
method described in the previous paragraph, the program calculated correlations existed 
between a data and lags up to 365 days prior. For attacks, there were no statistically 
significant correlations, as indicated by the correlation coefficients themselves and 
corresponding hypothesis test statistics that are generated by the program.  
If there was any autocorrelation detected, then the next step would be to 
determine an appropriate time-series model where an equation would yield estimates that 
best fit the existing data; however, given that there was no correlation within the time 
series data and lagged values, this was not necessary. 
I repeated this technique for corresponding latitude and longitude values to see if 
a spatial relationship between the site of an attack and an attack at a lagged point in time 
as far as 25 attacks prior. There was a weak correlation between the latitude data and lags 
                                                 
121 James Roy Newman ed., The World of Mathematics (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1956), 1247, 
quoted in Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, 34.  
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of t-1 and t-2; however, these were still fairly weak. Also, considering the statistic would 
only merit further examination if there was a corresponding correlation between the same 
lags of longitudinal data, which would then offer the possibility of a predictive model on 
two dimensions. If there is a relationship between the latitude of an attack at time t and 
previous attacks one or two times prior, but only that relationship, it would have the 
effect of predicting an attack will happen in Baltimore, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City or 
Reno, because they share a latitude that is similar, but not knowing which one because 
the longitudinal data (east to west) is random. For those reasons, it was generally asserted 
in the thesis that the geospatial data of attacks over time is random. 
Use of a Gamma Distribution to Estimate the Random Numbers for Casualties 
within the Monte Carlo Model 
I describe in Chapter III the challenge of determining appropriate random 
numbers for the Monte Carlo model. I built this model using Microsoft Excel, which will 
yield any number between zero and one with equal probability. I evaluated the frequency 
of casualty rates in lone actor attacks, and recognized that this data is neither equally 
distributed, like the random numbers, nor normally distributed, where most of the attacks 
would result in casualties close to the mean value of all attacks, and taper gradually in 
numbers greater than or less than the mean at equivalent rates. Instead, the data appeared 
to be skewed, which means that the distribution of each casualty rate from one to 
progressively rising numbers is asymmetrical.122 If I applied either the default random 
number generator in Excel, or adjusted the random numbers to follow a normal 
distribution, the simulated casualty rates would be to frequent for values, and to 
infrequent in others. The actual data resembled an exponential function, where most of 
the attacks were five or fewer, but occasionally yielded greater numbers, and very 
occasional “black swan” attacks where more than twenty died from the attack.123 
122 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Measures of Skewness and Kurtosis,” in 
Engineering Statistics Handbook [online], last updated October 30, 2013, 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/eda/section3/eda35b.htm.  
123 It should be noted that such large-scale attacks have been growing in frequency in recent years and 
are arguably less “black swan” events than they once were.  
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To yield simulation data that best fit the actual data, I tried a gamma distribution 
that resembled the shape of the data. The parameters were chosen based on a naked-eye 
estimate of different gamma distributions, and then iterated in the model until 
the simulation yielded data that best resembled the actual data.124 Figure 1 illustrates 
the difference between frequencies of casualty rates that were yielded by the 
default random number generator (the left bars, colored in blue), the gamma distributed 
data (the center bars, in red), and the actual data (the right bars, in green).  
Figure 1.  Frequency Comparisons of Simulated Casualty Rates from Random 
Numbers, Random Numbers that are Gamma Distributed, and Actual 
Casualty Rates 
Note: Frequency rates appear on the vertical (Y) axis, and casualty rates appear on the horizontal 
(X) axis 
To further validate the fit of the gamma model, a Chi-squared goodness of fit test 
was used.125 This test often, but not always, yielded values that indicated that the gamma 
distribution was, within 95 percent certainty, the best fit for the actual data. 
124 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Gamma Distribution,” in Engineering Statistics 
Handbook [online], last updated October 30, 2013, 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/eda/section3/eda366b.htm.  
125 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Chi-Squared Goodness of Fit Test,” in 
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Table 16.  Lone Actor Attacks in the United States 
DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
1/28/1982 Los Angeles California 1 0 34.05349 -118.24532 
4/5/1982 New York City New York 1 8 40.71278 -74.005941 
5/4/1982 Somerville Massachusetts 1 0 42.38668 -71.098264 
5/5/1982 Nashville Tennessee 1 1 36.16778 -86.778365 
5/16/1982 San Juan Puerto Rico 1 3 18.46617 -66.106654 
5/18/1982 San Juan Puerto Rico 1 2 18.46617 -66.106654 
5/22/1982 Stamford Connecticut 1 0 41.05182 -73.542234 
8/2/1982 Houston Texas 1 0 29.76045 -95.369784 
8/11/1982 Honolulu Hawaii 1 15 21.30694 -157.85833 
8/20/1982 Miami Florida 8 3 25.79649 -80.226683 
12/8/1982 Washington District of Columbia 1 0 38.89037 -77.031959 
2/13/1983 Medina North Dakota 2 1 46.89426 -99.299994 
8/8/1983 Canton Michigan 1 0 42.30865 -83.482158 
8/9/1983 Detroit Michigan 2 0 42.33169 -83.047924 
9/21/1983 New York City New York 1 0 40.71278 -74.005941 
1/27/1984 Dallas Texas 1 0 32.77816 -96.795404 
5/28/1984 San Francisco California 1 1 37.77713 -122.41964 
6/18/1984 Denver Colorado 1 0 39.74015 -104.94841 
6/29/1984 Dallas Texas 6 1 32.78011 -96.800008 
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DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
7/18/1984 San Ysidro California 22 19 32.552 -117.04308 
6/2/1985 Cleveland Ohio 1 0 41.50437 -81.690459 
10/11/1985 Santa Ana California 1 0 33.74557 -117.86783 
12/11/1985 Sacramento California 1 0 38.57907 -121.49101 
4/29/1986 San Juan Puerto Rico 1 0 18.46617 -66.106654 
8/20/1986 Edmond Oklahoma 15 6 35.6672 -97.42937 
4/23/1987 Palm Bay Florida 6 14 28.03319 -80.64297 
8/7/1987 Garden Grove California 1 0 33.77607 -117.93616 
2/16/1988 Sunnyvale California 7 4 37.36883 -122.03635 
6/20/1988 Mayaguez Puerto Rico 1 1 18.20132 -67.145125 
1/17/1989 Stockton California 6 29 37.9577 -121.29078 
9/14/1989 Louisville Kentucky 9 12 38.25424 -85.759407 
11/22/1989 Seven Corners Virginia 1 0 38.86078 -77.143347 
12/16/1989 Mountain Brook Alabama 1 1 33.50212 -86.755509 
12/18/1989 Savannah Georgia 1 0 32.08078 -81.090719 
1/30/1990 Tucson Arizona 1 0 32.22223 -110.92575 
2/8/1990 Knoxville Tennessee 1 0 36.01258 -84.016279 
6/18/1990 Jacksonville Florida 10 4 30.33218 -81.655651 
9/22/1990 Bailey’s Crossroads Virginia 2 0 38.84803 -77.12916 
11/5/1990 New York City New York 1 0 40.71278 -74.005941 
2/18/1991 Miami Florida 1 0 25.76437 -80.201529 
3/15/1991 Miami Florida 1 0 25.76437 -80.201529 
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DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
10/16/1991 Killeen Texas 24 20 31.11712 -97.727796 
11/1/1991 Iowa City Iowa 6 1 41.66069 -91.530221 
11/14/1991 Royal Oak Michigan 5 5 42.48948 -83.144649 
2/18/1992 Boston Massachusetts 1 0 42.35864 -71.056699 
3/11/1992 New York City New York 1 0 40.71278 -74.005941 
5/1/1992 Olivehurst California 4 10 39.07869 -121.54758 
10/15/1992 Watkins Glen New York 5 0 42.38106 -76.870578 
7/1/1993 San Francisco California 9 6 37.77896 -122.4192 
8/6/1993 Fayetteville North Carolina 4 8 35.05299 -78.878706 
12/7/1993 New York City New York 6 19 40.72677 -73.634296 
12/14/1993 Garden City Aurora, Colorado 4 1 39.75471 -104.83587 
3/1/1994 New York City New York 1 3 40.71278 -74.005941 
3/9/1994 Miami Florida 1 0 25.76437 -80.201529 
5/29/1994 New York City New York 1 0 40.71278 -74.005941 
6/20/1994 
Fairchild Air Force 
Base Washington 5 23 47.61864 -117.64836 
7/29/1994 Pensacola Florida 2 1 30.42085 -87.217239 
9/12/1994 Washington District of Columbia 1 0 38.89037 -77.031959 
10/16/1994 Lubbock Texas 1 0 33.57786 -101.85481 
12/10/1994 Caldwell New Jersey 1 0 40.84144 -74.276645 
12/30/1994 Brookline Massachusetts 1 3 42.33178 -71.121182 
4/3/1995 Corpus Christi Texas 6 0 27.82371 -97.417398 
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DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
4/19/1995 Oklahoma City Oklahoma 168 650 35.47202 -97.520354 
4/24/1995 Sacramento California 1 0 38.57907 -121.49101 
10/9/1995 Hyder Arizona 1 78 33.01499 -113.35217 
1/23/1996 Miami Florida 1 0 25.76437 -80.201529 
2/9/1996 Fort Lauderdale Florida 6 1 26.12231 -80.143379 
7/27/1996 Atlanta Georgia 1 110 33.74832 -84.391109 
2/23/1997 New York City New York 1 6 40.71278 -74.005941 
9/15/1997 Aiken South Carolina 4 3 33.55986 -81.721952 
12/18/1997 Orange California 5 2 33.78779 -117.85311 
12/30/1997 Oakwood Illinois 1 0 40.11411 -87.778197 
1/29/1998 Birmingham Alabama 1 1 33.5203 -86.811504 
3/6/1998 Newington Connecticut 5 1 41.68563 -72.729838 
3/24/1998 Jonesboro Arkansas 5 10 35.82099 -90.668261 
5/21/1998 Springfield Oregon 4 25 44.04624 -123.02203 
7/24/1998 Washington District of Columbia 2 1 38.89037 -77.031959 
10/23/1998 Amherst New York 1 0 42.97837 -78.799942 
4/20/1999 Littleton Colorado 15 24 39.61691 -105.01452 
7/1/1999 Redding California 2 0 40.58752 -122.39293 
7/2/1999 Skokie Illinois 1 0 42.02634 -87.755679 
7/4/1999 Bloomington Indiana 2 0 39.16402 -86.509869 
7/29/1999 Atlanta Georgia 9 13 33.7491 -84.390185 
9/15/1999 Fort Worth Texas 8 7 32.6934 -97.470671 
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11/2/1999 Honolulu Hawaii 7 0 21.32551 -157.84731 
12/30/1999 Tampa Florida 5 3 27.94776 -82.458444 
12/26/2000 Wakefield Massachusetts 7 0 42.50648 -71.072831 
2/5/2001 Melrose Park Illinois 5 4 41.90059 -87.856728 
10/2/2001 Boca Raton Florida 1 5 26.36831 -80.128932 
10/9/2001 Washington District of Columbia 2 1 38.89037 -77.031959 
10/15/2001 Washington District of Columbia 2 6 38.89037 -77.031959 
10/29/2001 New York City New York 1 0 40.71278 -74.005941 
11/14/2001 Oxford Connecticut 1 0 41.43977 -73.126816 
1/5/2002 Tampa Florida 1 0 27.94735 -82.45875 
7/4/2002 Los Angeles California 3 4 34.05349 -118.24532 
7/8/2003 Meridian Mississippi 7 8 32.37608 -88.68978 
12/8/2004 Columbus Ohio 5 7 39.96226 -83.000707 
3/12/2005 Brookfield Wisconsin 7 4 43.06057 -88.106479 
3/21/2005 Red Lake Minnesota 10 5 47.87635 -95.01694 
1/30/2006 Goleta California 8 0 34.43628 -119.87144 
3/25/2006 Seattle Washington 7 2 47.6229 -122.3165 
7/28/2006 Seattle Washington 1 5 47.60356 -122.32944 
10/2/2006 Lancaster County Pennsylvania 6 5 39.9589 -76.0806 
2/12/2007 Salt Lake City Utah 6 4 40.76065 -111.89109 
4/16/2007 Blacksburg Virginia 32 23 37.22957 -80.413939 
10/7/2007 Crandon Wisconsin 6 1 45.57191 -88.902892 
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12/5/2007 Omaha Nebraska 9 4 41.25873 -95.937873 
2/7/2008 Kirkwood Missouri 6 2 38.58339 -90.406785 
2/14/2008 DeKalb Illinois 5 21 41.92947 -88.750365 
6/25/2008 Henderson Kentucky 6 1 37.76721 -87.557374 
7/27/2008 Knoxville Tennessee 2 7 35.95176 -83.952337 
3/29/2009 Carthage North Carolina 8 3 35.3458 -79.417054 
4/3/2009 Binghamton New York 14 4 42.09869 -75.917974 
5/30/2009 Arivaca Arizona 2 1 31.57734 -111.33145 
5/31/2009 Wichita Kansas 1 0 37.68698 -97.335579 
6/1/2009 Little Rock Arkansas 1 1 34.75712 -92.380745 
6/10/2009 Washington District of Columbia 1 
 
38.88671 -77.032607 
11/5/2009 Killeen Texas 13 32 31.13 -97.78 
11/29/2009 Parkland Washington 4 1 47.15585 -122.43703 
2/18/2010 Austin Texas 2 15 30.26761 -97.742984 
3/4/2010 Arlington Virginia 1 2 38.87186 -77.056267 
8/3/2010 Manchester Connecticut 9 2 41.77593 -72.521476 
9/1/2010 Silver Spring Maryland 1 0 38.99551 -77.028075 
1/8/2011 Tucson Arizona 6 13 32.22174 -110.92648 
9/6/2011 Carson City Nevada 5 7 39.1638 -119.7674 
10/14/2011 Seal Beach California 8 1 33.74118 -118.10464 
2/22/2012 Norcross Georgia 5 0 33.94121 -84.213531 
4/2/2012 Oakland California 7 3 37.80438 -122.27082 
 91 
DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
5/20/2012 Seattle Washington 6 1 47.60383 -122.33006 
7/20/2012 Aurora Colorado 12 70 39.70928 -104.82349 
8/5/2012 Oak Creek Wisconsin 7 4 42.88585 -87.863136 
9/27/2012 Minneapolis Minnesota 7 1 44.9773 -93.265469 
12/14/2012 Newtown Connecticut 27 2 41.41232 -73.311424 
2/7/2013 Corona California 1 1 33.87529 -117.56644 
3/13/2013 Herkimer County New York 5 2 43.0456 -74.984891 
4/15/2013 Boston Massachusetts 2 132 42.35027 -71.080976 
4/17/2013 West Texas 15 151 31.81668 -97.087902 
4/18/2013 Cambridge Massachusetts 1 0 42.35961 -71.093134 
4/19/2013 Watertown Massachusetts 2 16 42.37089 -71.182911 
4/21/2013 Federal Way Washington 5 0 47.31296 -122.33937 
6/7/2013 Santa Monica California 6 3 34.00862 -118.49475 
7/26/2013 Hialeah Florida 7 0 25.86701 -80.291463 
9/16/2013 Washington District of Columbia 12 8 38.87498 -76.99453 
11/1/2013 Los Angeles California 1 4 33.94159 -118.40853 
2/20/2014 Alturas California 4 2 41.4871 -120.54224 
4/3/2014 Fort Hood Texas 3 12 
  4/13/2014 Overland Park Kansas 2 0 38.98223 -94.670792 
4/27/2014 Seattle Washington 1 0 47.49242 -122.23911 
5/23/2014 Santa Barbara California 6 13 
  6/1/2014 Seattle Washington 2 0 47.6153 -122.32344 
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DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
6/6/2014 Cumming Georgia 1 1 34.20641 -84.13969 
6/8/2014 Las Vegas Nevada 5 0 36.16481 -115.06286 
6/25/2014 West Orange New Jersey 1 0 40.79859 -74.238395 
9/12/2014 Blooming Grove Pennsylvania 1 1 41.37012 -75.154073 
10/23/2014 New York City New York 1 3 40.72822 -73.797888 
10/24/2014 Marysville Washington 5 1 48.05082 -122.17692 
11/28/2014 Austin Texas 1 0 30.26744 -97.734942 
12/18/2014 Morganton North Carolina 1 0 35.74541 -81.684819 
12/20/2014 New York City New York 2 0 40.67818 -73.941773 
2/10/2015 Chapel Hill North Carolina 3 0 35.89671 -79.009738 
3/20/2015 New Orleans Louisiana 1 2 29.98437 -90.257301 
5/3/2015 Garland Texas 2 1 32.95903 -96.641877 
6/11/2015 Menasha Wisconsin 3 1 
  6/17/2015 Charleston South Carolina 9 0 32.78747 -79.933101 
7/16/2015 Chattanooga Tennessee 6 2 35.09508 -85.253424 
7/23/2015 Lafayette Louisiana 3 9 30.20197 -92.045686 
10/1/2015 Roseburg Oregon 9 9 
  10/31/2015 Colorado Springs Colorado 3 0 
  11/4/2015 Merced California 1 4 37.3658 -120.42477 
11/27/2015 Colorado Springs Colorado 3 9 38.88089 -104.84905 
12/2/2015 San Bernardino California 16 17 34.07577 -117.27792 
2/11/2016 Columbus Ohio 1 4 40.06402 -82.863818 
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DATE CITY STATE DEATHS INJURIES LAT. LONG. 
2/20/2016 Kalamazoo County Michigan 6 2 
  2/25/2016 Hesston Kansas 3 14 
  6/12/2016 Orlando Florida 50 53 28.5196 -81.376794 
7/7/2016 Dallas Texas 6 9 32.77958 -96.804259 
7/7/2016 Dallas Texas 5 11 
  7/17/2016 Baton Rouge Louisiana 4 3 30.43348 -91.080857 
8/13/2016 New York City New York 2 0 40.6794 -73.858592 
9/16/2016 Philadelphia Pennsylvania 2 5 39.9575 -75.222965 
9/17/2016 St. Cloud Minnesota 1 10 45.55558 -94.210178 
9/23/2016 Burlington Washington 5 0 
  11/28/2016 Columbus Ohio 1 11 40.00329 -83.011421 
1/6/2017 Fort Lauderdale Florida 5 6 
  4/18/2017 Fresno California 3 0 
  5/12/2017 Kirkersville  Ohio 3 0 
  6/5/2017 Orlando Florida 5 0 
  6/7/2017 Tunkhannock Pennsylvania 3 0 
  6/14/2017 San Francisco California 3 2 
  10/1/2017 Las Vegas Nevada 58 527 
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APPENDIX C.  EXPERIMENT SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Preamble 
In this survey, you are asked to review five case studies and decide whether the 
individual described in the case may commit violence. For the sake of the survey, please 
assume that the information that appears is what would be typically available after a brief 
field investigation over three days or less. Investigative techniques may include voluntary 
statements by the subject, statements by the subject’s friends, family and associates, 
material posted in publicly available on-line forums, and arrest records.  
The scenarios that appear are randomly selected for every volunteer in this 
survey. Some or all of these scenarios derive from actual cases. Although steps have been 
taken to obscure these cases, you may recognize one or more of them. If that occurs, 
please check the “I am familiar with this case” box below each scenario, and answer the 
remaining questions. 





Please describe your professional background 
 
Law enforcement    y/n Years of experience in this field _____ 
 
Fire department or EMS   y/n  Years of experience in this field _____ 
 
Military ____    y/n Years of experience in this field _____ 
 
Medicine or Public Health ____  y/n Years of experience in this field _____ 
 
Social Worker ____    y/n Years of experience in this field _____ 
 
Other (describe) ___________  Years of experience in this field _____ 
 






A subject is being investigated for unusual behavior at his former 
school—a county-run community college. The subject withdrew from the 
college after a nine-month series of incidents wherein he engaged in series 
of verbal outbursts in classes and threatened two professors. These 
incidents led to five encounters with the campus police. Prior to these 
encounters with the police, the subject was arrested in previous years for 
low-level drug offenses and vandalism.  
The subject’s friends and family describe the subject’s behavior as a 
recent change: while in high school he was intense, intelligent, and good at 
math. In his junior year, he became more distant, appeared in class 
intoxicated, was said to frequently speak about government conspiracies, 
and eventually dropped out of high school. 
The subject is active online, and through chat rooms and posted videos of 
himself it appears he owns at least two firearms, a semiautomatic pistol 
and a shotgun. He has two tattoos, one on each shoulder blade, of nine-
millimeter bullets. In other statements, he speaks or writes of voices in his 
head, and others involve the theme of the government listening to him and 
circulating a “new currency.” Another post pictures a history book with an 
image of the White House on the cover, over which the subject has placed 
a pistol. Also online, he claims to have attempted to join the military but 
could not because of his history of drug use. He also admits to trouble 
holding regular employment in general. He was fired from a job, more 
than once, for outbursts on the job.  
Are you familiar with this case? 
Do you think this subject should be investigated further? 
If you chose to investigate further, what would be your next investigative step? 
On a scale of 0 to 100, rate how likely it is that this subject will commit violence in the 
future. 
Based on the facts you read, do you think there is cause to arrest this subject? 






You are called to interview a subject who was stopped by police for 
having a hatchet visibly tucked in his waistband near a secure government 
building. A query of your agency’s records shows that a colleague of 
yours, who works about 150 miles away, interviewed the subject one day 
ago. On that occasion, a state trooper stopped the subject for speeding and 
evading police. A sawed-off shotgun and a map of Washington DC were 
visible on the passenger seat. When trooper examined the map further, the 
he saw that government buildings were circled with a red marker. The 
subject was arrested for evading the police, and your colleague was 
contacted to interview the subject further about the map and gun. 
During the interview, the subject explained that he was a recently 
discharged combat veteran and that his evasive driving was a momentary 
“flashback” from his combat experience. Your colleague and the police 
accepted the explanation, seized his shotgun, and released him from 
custody. 
After learning these details, you interview the subject, who is cooperative. 
He consents to a search of his nearby vehicle, where you find he has two 
dogs locked inside, two other hatchets, and several empty ammunition 
cartridges but no firearms. 
Are you familiar with this case? 
Do you think this subject should be investigated further? 
If you chose to investigate further, what would be your next investigative step? 
On a scale of 0 to 100, rate how likely it is that this subject will commit violence in the 
future. 
Based on the facts you read, do you think there is cause to arrest this subject? 





You receive a case to investigate a military doctor, who raised suspicions 
by communicating with a known terrorist leader.  
You query the subject’s military personnel record and discover that he is a 
medical doctor who recently completed a public health fellowship at a 
nearby military medical school. You also see that the subject has served in 
the military for over 15 years and was recently promoted to the rank of 
major. The subject is about to be transferred for a short-term assignment to 
another state before being deployed to a medical assignment in a combat 
zone. 
Are you familiar with this case? 
Do you think this subject should be investigated further? 
If you chose to investigate further, what would be your next investigative step? 
On a scale of 0 to 100, rate how likely it is that this subject will commit violence in the 
future.  
Based on the facts you read, do you think there is cause to arrest this subject? 




Scenario 4  
You are called to investigate a teenage subject whom you and your agency 
encountered before for various complaints of disruptive activity. The most 
recent complaint was when the subject was accused, along with a friend 
who is the same age, of breaking into a vehicle and stealing items inside. 
On this occasion, your agency received complaints about the online 
activity of the subject, who posted online videos and comments including 
violent rants and a death threat. 
Reviewing the online posts and other internet activity, you note that the 
subject’s friend is interested in Adolph Hitler, made several racist and 
homophobic rants, plans to destroy his high school, and listed personal 
grievances that he wishes to avenge. He also boasts of owning weapons, 
detonating small explosive devices, and vandalizing homes in the middle 
of the night; however, you have not found proof of these boasts. 
Witnesses tell a mixed story about the subject. His high school 
administrators say he appears intelligent and polite with no record of 
discipline; however, he also appears to be isolated from the student body 
and generally associates with two or three other students. Other associates 
from school and work report that he has openly boasted of assembling 
pipe bombs and other devices. He showed a pipe bomb to associates at 
work.  
Are you familiar with this case? 
Do you think this subject should be investigated further? 
If you chose to investigate further, what would be your next investigative step? 
On a scale of 0 to 100, rate how likely it is that this subject will commit violence in the 
future.  
Based on the facts you read, do you think there is cause to arrest this subject? 




Scenario 5  
You are called to investigate a teenage subject whom you and your agency 
encountered before for various complaints of disruptive activity. The most 
recent complaint was when the subject was accused, along with a friend 
who is the same age, of breaking into a vehicle and stealing items inside. 
On this occasion, your agency received complaints about the online 
activity of his friend, who posted online videos and comments including 
violent rants and a death threat. The subject is mentioned in some of the 
posts. 
Reviewing the online posts and other internet activity, you note that the 
subject’s friend is interested in Adolph Hitler, made several racist and 
homophobic rants, plans to destroy his high school, and listed personal 
grievances that he wishes to avenge. He also boasts of owning weapons, 
detonating small explosive devices, and vandalizing homes in the middle 
of the night; however, you have not found proof of these boasts. 
Witnesses describe the subject as socially isolated at school with only a 
few friends. He was a good student his first year in high school, but for the 
following three years he struggled. On some occasions, he submitted 
assignments that researched Charles Manson; others were fictional 
fantasies of a single gunman who commits mass killings. 
Are you familiar with this case? 
Do you think this subject should be investigated further? 
If you chose to investigate further, what would be your next investigative step? 
On a scale of 0 to 100, rate how likely it is that this subject will commit violence in the 
future.  
Based on the facts you read, do you think there is cause to arrest this subject? 





The next few questions assess your general decision making.  
Imagine you are managing an investigative squad in a homeland security agency, 
and you need to decide whether to open or close an investigation.  
If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher-priority case? 
 
A. B. 
50% chance to save seven lives 
50% chance that the case is a false alarm 
(nothing happens) 
100% chance to save three lives 
 
If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher-priority case? 
 
A. B. 
50% chance to prevent $55 million of 
damage 
50% chance that the case is a false alarm 
(nothing happens) 
100% chance to prevent $25 million of 
damages 
 
If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher-priority case? 
 
A. B. 
1% chance that 100 people will die 
33% that 9 people will die 
67% that it is a false alarm 
100% chance that three people will die 
 
If you could only choose one, which do you consider the higher-priority case? 
 
A. B. 
1% chance that $700 million of damage 
will occur 
33% that $30 million of damage will occur 
67% that it is a false alarm 




Imagine you are up for promotion. Only 1% of cases you receive have 
intelligence as solid as the case your boss gives you. He assigns it to you, and promises 
that if you succeed, you will receive a $10,000 performance bonus. Once you begin 
investigating, you realize that the intelligence is not as clear as you originally thought. 
Success may hinge on how long you investigate. Which choice below would you make? 
 
Commit to a long investigation. Close the case quickly. 
45% chance that the case is fully successful 
(full $10,000 bonus) 
55% chance that the case is a false alarm 
100% chance that if you cut the case short, 
you will receive the bonus you received 
last year ($5,000) 
 
You receive a promotion from your last case that increases your salary by $10,000 
per year. Now, as a manager, you have to make the tough choices. Another case arrives 
on your desk, a “1 %” case, with the same issues as the last scenario. Here, you have to 
make a tough resource-allocation decision: 
 
Commit to a long investigation. Close the case quickly. 
45% chance that the case is fully successful 
55% chance that the case is a false alarm 
and that your agency will be sued for 
($10,000 loss) 
100% chance that if you cut the case short, 
you will only waste the time and resources 
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